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Abstract
This thesis surveys the relationship between late Roman Stoicism and nineteenth century
dandyism. This correlation is based on comments within the Barbeyan and Baudelairean
dandyist theories as expanded in “Du dandysme et de Georges Brummell” (1845) and “Le
Peintre de la vie moderne” (1863) respectively. In both of these texts, several references are
made to dandies as Stoics or possessing stoic qualities, primarily an attitude of indifference.
Though Stoic influence is a recurring theme throughout dandy practice and theory, both
nominally and performatively, few literary critics have addressed the dandy’s particularly
modern use of ancient Stoic doctrine. This thesis argues that the dandy’s adoption of ancient
Stoic influence is ironic, using both appropriation and parody to interpret ancient Stoic
behavioural practice. By comparing and contrasting approaches to emotional and behavioural
strategies – impressions, judgment and rationality, and preferred indifferents – I demonstrate the
shift from ancient Stoic apatheia to the modern apathy.

Keywords: Jules Barbey d’Aurevilly, Charles Baudelaire, Dandyism, Stoicism, Neo-Stoicism,
Apathy, Indifference, Ennui, Modernity
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1
Introduction
A new form of celebrity emerged in the nineteenth century: a well-dressed and
impeccably groomed, indifferent and intellectual man. This man was known as the dandy. A
persona that existed mainly in the cultural hubs of Paris and London, the dandy gained
unprecedented social recognition for his role as an ambassador of elegance. As the authority on
the era’s manifestations of beauty, these individuals came to epitomize the tastes of the times
with their clothing, mannerisms, and social lives. At the same time, however, an undercurrent of
irony has been identified in the performative practice of dandyism. The recognition of the
dandy’s use of irony substantially alters the perception of the dandy’s appropriation of trends,
leading to a reconsideration of his echoing actions as social critique. Following this line of
thought, Benjamin detailed the Baudelairean dandy’s ironic heroism, but one aspect which has
been not been sufficiently discussed is the dandy’s alleged Stoicism. This thesis sheds light on
the dandy’s self-ascribed relation to the ancient philosophy of Stoicism, especially as seen in the
theoretical dandy treatises by Jules Barbey d’Aurevilly and Charles Baudelaire. The trajectory of
this thesis pursues the following assumption: if the dandy appropriates trends ironically, and
there is a dialogue within his nineteenth century contemporaries with ancient Stoicism that
creates a specific kind of neo-stoicism, then the version of neo-stoicism found in dandyism
should be treated ironically as well. Tracing the presence of Stoicism in these two dandies’
works will enable me to infer broader implications for dandyism and its progression after midnineteenth century. The dandy has often been misinterpreted, but it is a testament to his appeal
that he continues to be studied to this day. Overall, this thesis hopes to present a fuller
understanding of this elusive cultural figure.

The first dandy was George ‘Beau’ Brummell (1778- 1840). With his legendary starched
cravats, polished boots, and acid wit, he reigned supreme over British society from the 1790s
until his exile to France in 1816. In Calais, safe from his creditors, he continued to fascinate both
French and English societies alike until his death in 1840. With Brummell, the practice crossed
into France, though it did not garner immediate attention in France. Dandyism began to appear in
French literature in 1830 with Honoré de Balzac’s Traité de la vie élégante and slowly gained
traction as “Musset, Balzac, Barbier and Stendhal himself all started introducing dandies as
characters in their work” (Godfrey 25). Dandyism continued to be developed in the works and
lives of French authors, especially Jules Barbey d’Aurevilly and Charles Baudelaire, two of
dandyism’s major adherents in France. At the turn of the twentieth century, the focus would shift
back to England for Oscar Wilde and Max Beerbohm. Still, Barbey and Baudelaire are unique
and especially important to dandyism as two of the most prolific and dedicated dandyist writers
in France. They are credited with developing dandyism in France and giving it its theoretical
foothold (Rossbach 81), moving the cult of celebrity from surface fascination to substantiated
study.
Before the efforts of Barbey and Baudelaire, dandyism was mostly performative and had
little explicit theory attached to it. Brummell had not had much need for writing theory, since
“cet homme, trop superficiellement jugé, fut une puissance si intellectuelle, qu’il regna encore
plus par les airs que par les mots” (“Du Dandysme” 138)1. Even though theories of dandyism
have since developed, dandyism remains a difficult practice to define. Broadly, it is the practice
of devoted self-cultivation and unshakeable calmness. Emphasis on originality makes
standardization difficult within the practice, so much so that some critics like Marie-Christine
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“So intellectual a power was this man, too superficially judged, that he ruled, even more by what he looked than by
what he said” (Dandyism 57)
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Natta in La Grandeur sans convictions suggest that all dandies – whether Brummell, Baudelaire,
Wilde, or Beerbohm – are all only vain attempts at dandyism (30). In addition to this, dandyism
is subjected to very polarized descriptions depending on the reviewer. In his preface to an
English edition of Barbey’s Du Dandysme et de George Brummell, Quentin Crisp neatly sums up
the paradox of the dandy by noting that “the dictionary states that dandyism is ‘ostentatious
elegance’ but it is in the very nature of elegance that it is not ostentatious” (8). While to some,
mostly dandies themselves, dandyism was a complex method of self-elaboration (The Painter
37; Dandyism 57; “What is Enlightenment” 41), to most, it was seen as empty vanity (Carlyle
207). The dandy was deemed ridiculous, flippant, and unimportant; he was often excluded from
‘more serious’ intellectual conversation by those who opposed what they viewed as the
thoroughly un-serious enterprise of fastidious and cultivated self-adornment and self-regulation.
As one of their most famous contemporary critics, Thomas Carlyle disdainfully called the dandy
merely a “clothes-wearing man” in Sartor Resartus (207), which appeared first as a serial in a
magazine in the early 1830s and as a novel in 1836. Though critics like Carlyle were quick to
dismiss the dandies as completely superficial, that reproach is itself the result of merely surface
inspection. Other examples of such criticism are easy enough to find. Though Carlyle led the
anti-dandiacal campaign in England, writers such as William Thackeray also disparaged
dandyism, and publications like Fraser’s Magazine (1830-1882) were particularly militant
against it as well (Moers 167). In France, Balzac and Stendhal were initially critics of the
dandyism. However, these critics often blatantly overlooked important facets of the Dandiacal
lifestyle, including the dandy’s notable function as social interpreter. At least, the apparent
contradiction between a figure who is casually deemed absurd by some of his contemporaries
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and yet held sway over both British and French societies for more than a century should make
one wary of denouncing the dandy without reflection (Godfrey 24).
Contrary to their critics, the dandies defined their efforts as ‘heroic.’ In response to what
he viewed as the ‘democratization’ of society, the dandy willed himself to be a paradigm of
difference and distinction in an age which he felt was succumbing to the equalization of
experience. It is in this vein that Baudelaire called dandyism “le dernier éclat d’heroïsme dans les
décadences” (“Le Peintre” 560),2 a last grand attempt to glorify the powers and pride of
humanity. The irony circulating beneath this characterization has been identified by the critic
Walter Benjamin. Benjamin states that the dandy’s heroism in the context of Modernity was
ironic, because Modernity is characterized by “the loss of certainty, and the realization that
certainty can never be established once and for all” (Delanty 3069). In such an unstable
atmosphere, there can be no Herculean deeds because the world is no longer “whole.” Thus,
Benjamin concludes that the dandy, though he may make heroic efforts, is not very heroic after
all: “the modern hero is no hero; he is a portrayer of heroes” (Benjamin 60). The dandy may
perform heroic aspects but is crucially unable to embody them fully in the context of Modernity.
Thus one of the main difficulties in examining dandyism does not lie in disputes over
their originality, as some literary critics have supposed, or to a lack of depth, but rather to the
dandy’s ironic spirit – that which ‘doubles’ him, causing “definitions of the dandy [to be] almost
as confusing as definitions of the word irony itself” (Godfrey 23). It is only in recognizing his
irony that we can attempt to define him at all. The irony was firstly dependent on the very
society it was mocking, for “the dandy, like the ironist, could not exist at all without a public
whose standards of taste, hierarchies of value and conventions of discourse he could predict. […]
Without a set of conventions to respect and oppose, neither figure can produce the effect that
2

“the last flicker of heroism in decadent ages” (The Painter 39).
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justifies its existence” (Godfrey 28). Overturning or mocking the accepted conceptions of society
are part and parcel of what it means to be a dandy. Replaying society back to itself, with a twist,
was the crux of his irony. As Karen Humphreys observes,
For Barbey and Baudelaire the model ironic dandy is shaped by intellectual acumen and
incisive self-awareness. Both artists strove desperately to carve out a lasting space in
literary tradition and the imprévu represented a unique and original form of creativity.
Their mutual valorization of the imprévu, the incorrigible, the irremediable, and the
irreparable reflects their refusal to be ruled and an obstinate unwillingness to “right”
their ways according to a moral majority (70).
To be unpredictable, yet relevant, is the dandy’s aim. If it is to be said that the dandy is a
mirror of society, then he is like the carnival-glass, warped and curved. Dandies themselves were
well-aware of their doubled nature and were keen to manipulate it. Barbey says that dandyism
“se joue de la règle et pourtant la respecte encore. Il en souffre et s’en venge tout en la subissant;
il s’en réclame quand il y échappe; il la domine et en est dominé tour à tour : double et muable
caractère!” (“Du Dandysme” 112)3 Baudelaire also points out the doubled status of dandyism by
remarking that it is “une institution en dehors des lois” (“Le Peintre” 559)4 but also that its laws
are drawn in opposition to the laws of common society. There is nothing the Baudelairean dandy
wants so much as “de combattre et de détruire la trivialité” (“Le Peintre” 560)5 which he thought
so prevalent in his contemporaries. It is in response to this that dandyism “a des lois rigoureuses
auxquelles sont strictement sousmis tous les sujets” (“Le Peintre” 559)6. As they span two
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“…while still respecting the conventionalities, plays with them. While admitting their power, it suffers from and
avenges itself upon them, and pleads them as an excuse against themselves; dominates and is dominated by them in
turn” (Dandyism 33)
4
“an institution outside the law” (The Painter 36).
5
“to combat and destroy triviality” (The Painter 39).
6
“a rigorous code of laws that all its subjects are strictly bound by” (The Painter 36).
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worlds, the Barbeyan and Baudelairean dandies are especially inclined to manipulate accepted
norms and conventions.
My proposal is that the Barbeyan and Baudelairean dandy also approaches his alleged
Stoicism with this ironic impetus. I will read the dandy’s irony as a mix of appropriation and
parody. Irony denotes a purposeful inversion of meaning in order to achieve dissimulation or
pretence, and the dandy achieves this through appropriation and parody. Appropriation is the
practice of reworking or imitating a style from another work to incite re-evaluation or critical
challenge (“appropriation”). Parody is the use of that imitation to produce satire by applying it to
an unlikely subject (“parody”).This allows the dandy to act as a distorted mirror or reflection of
his contemporaries by showing them the extent of their own illusions. Thus, what I call
‘therapeutic’ neo-stoicisms in the dandy’s contemporaries become ironized (that is, appropriated
and parodied) in the dandy’s own practices.
Through historical contextualization I will outline the presence of this neo-stoic dialogue
in the nineteenth century. This tumultuous century was a time of economic, political, and social
democratization, as well as prolific urban expansion. The 1800s in Europe are characterized as a
period of substantial upheaval in which the stresses of modernity and metropolitan living were
causing a rapid reorganization of life across England and France. This in turn instigated the
development of the literary and aesthetic ‘Modernisms.’ In response to this, a neo-stoicism
emerged in the writings and life practices of thinkers across Europe. This European neo-stoicism
had primarily to do with a response to rapid and disorienting changes occurring at that time.
Indifference and emotional restraint become part of a ‘therapeutic’ response to issues that arose
with Modernity. So popular a theme was not to be missed by the dandy who was keenly aware of
any trends of the day and who took great pains to make them his own. Outwardly, he displayed
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the stoic’s most famous countenance: an indifferent face to the rapidly changing world.
Internally, he negotiated a new relation of the individual to the world. This thesis will look at the
dandy’s appropriation of Stoic influence in order to see what changes the dandies make to
cultivate their own brand of ironic neo-stoicism.
On the surface, it may appear to be an absurd comparison to juxtapose the ascetic ancient
Stoic and the pampered nineteenth century dandy. That said, when reading about dandyism, the
adjective ‘stoic’ is often attributed to dandies. Within the dandy practice itself, both Jules Barbey
d’Aurevilly and Charles Baudelaire explicitly name themselves and their constituents as ‘stoic.’
Barbey calls dandies “stoïciens du boudoir” (“Du Dandysme” 148)7, while Baudelaire states that
“on voit que, de certains côtés, le dandysme confine au spiritualisme et au stoïcisme” (“Le
Peintre” 560).8 In addition to this, dandies trace their collective ‘genealogy’ leading back to
“César, Catalina, Alcibiade” (“Le Peintre” 559),9 quite distinct from the genealogy of fops that
their contemporary critics tried to impose on them. These references can be read in three ways.
Naming dandies as Stoics could be either a factual identification, a watered-down modern
sense of ‘stoic’, or a disingenuous characterization. Though the dandies were classically
educated and therefore had ample exposure to the philosophy, it would be naïve to presume that
an attempt to adopt ancient Stoic practices would manifest in the same way nearly two millennia
later. Even within classical Stoicism’s long history, it changed considerably, and the
transformations of Modernity changed its formulations even more. Especially in the context of
someone so invested in the present as Baudelaire, having even coined a definition of Modernity,
to identify completely with a concept prevalent in the ancient world is unfeasible – but to
identify partially with it is possible.
7

“stoics of the boudoir” (Dandyism 64).
“clearly, then, dandyism in certain respects comes close to spiritualism and to stoicism” (The Painter 38).
9
“Caesar, Catalina, Alcibiades” (Le Peintre 36)
8
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Perhaps, then, the ‘stoic’ reference is meant more casually. It is important to note the
semantic shift in the word ‘Stoic’ from signifying an adherent to the specific doctrine of Stoic
philosophy into functioning merely as a ‘weaker’ adjective. As such an adjective, ‘stoic’ retains
only some of its original meaning in the popular vernacular of nineteenth century Modernity. A
‘stoic’ response in the nineteenth century C.E. means only a measured and emotionless response.
While this was constituent of the term in the second century B.C.E., it also carried a much
broader and more complex philosophic practice. Generally, and rationally so, the inclination is to
assume that when ‘Stoic’ occurs in dandy texts it is only in reference to this newer meaning of
the word, separate from the ancient philosophy. However, there are numerous reasons why this
characterization goes deeper than the surface. First, the performance of indifference by the
dandies is within the same ‘therapeutic’ context as ancient Stoic indifference. Second, the
dandies make several references to historical figures who are Stoics themselves which belies a
closer connection. Third, the explicit theorization of dandyism by mid-nineteenth century French
dandies demands a weightier philosophical consideration of all its constituent parts, including the
‘stoic’. Fourth and finally, the precision which dandies employ in all other aspects of their life
cannot have suffered a total lapse in this sole area. For these reasons, I am disinclined to accept
the dandy’s ancient Stoic influence as only surface allusion. Instead, I choose to read the stoic
dandy as an ironic characterization, a modern neo-stoicism. I will be approaching the use of
‘stoic’ in the dandy context just as Benjamin approached ‘hero’ in the dandy context: as an
attempt, a performance.
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Literature Survey
There is a large body of literary criticism on the dandy. One of the most important texts is the
seminal handbook The Dandy: From Brummell to Beerbohm (1960) by Ellen Moers. Though it
was written nearly a half-century ago, it remains highly relevant for its comprehensive
contextualization of dandyism both socially and historically. Other helpful introductory books on
the dandy include: Dandies (1968) by James Laver, Le Dandysme de Baudelaire à Mallarmé
(1978) by Michel Lemaire, and Le Dandysme (1988) by Patrick Favardin and Laurent Bouëxière.
These provide comprehensive histories and define the elusive nature of the dandy. Fewer critical
texts focus on individual dandies, such as Talon Rouge: Barbey d’Aurevilly, le dandy absolu
(1986) by Arnould de Liedekerke and The Evolution of Dandyism in Baudelaire’s Thought:
Dandy, Hero, Saint (1987) by Kenneth Sutherland McKellar.
There is a small branch of dandy criticism that deals with tracing the history of dandyism.
The dandy is of course not a phenomenon isolated to the nineteenth century. Studies of
alternative dandyism can be seen in The Aristocrat as Art: A study of the Honnete Homme and
the Dandy in seventeenth- and nineteenth-century French literature (1980) by Domna C. Stanton
and The Dandy and the Herald: Manners, Mind, and Morals from Brummell to Durrell (1988)
by Richard Pine. Stanton’s text sees nineteenth century dandyism as the inheritor of a practice
called honnêtété, or rather, the practice of making oneself agreeable or cultivating an honourable
character, from the seventeenth century. Pine’s text, on the other hand, sees the dandies as the
force which enabled and foregrounded modernist movements of the twentieth century.
One of the major trends in dandy criticism focuses on the sartorial side of the dandy.
These include texts such as Dandies: Fashion and Finesse in Art and Culture (2001) by Susan
Fillen-Yeh, and Eccentricity and the Cultural Imagination in Nineteenth Century Paris (2009)
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by Miranda Gill, which both focus on fashion, trends and other era-specific behaviour. Dandyism
also finds pride of place in broader topical anthologies such as The Anatomy of Fashion:
Dressing the Body from the Renaissance to Today (2009) by Susan Vincent, Fashioning London:
Clothing and the Modern Metropolis (2004) by Christopher Breward, and Paris Fashion: A
Cultural History (2010) by Valerie Steele.
Other attempts trace the evolution of the cult of celebrity, as in Beau Brummell: The
Ultimate Man of Style (2006) by Ian Kelly, which crowns that Brummell the ‘original celebrity.’
The British pop dandy: masculinity, popular music and culture (2009) by Stan Hawkins and
Rising Star: Dandyism, Gender, and Performance in the fin de siècle (1998) by Rhonda Garelick
both fuse the study of the dandy as celebrity with another trend, the performance of identity.
Identity performance is a particularly hot topic, both racially, as in Slaves to Fashion: Black
Dandyism and the Styling of Black Diasporic Identity (2009) by Monica Miller, and with regards
to gender, as in Gender on the Divide: The Dandy in Modernist Literature (1993) by Jessica
Feldman, Performing the Dandy: Manuel Machado and the Anxiety of Masculinity (2003) by
Jose Ignacio Badenes, and Dandies and Desert Saints: Styles of Victorian Masculinity (1995) by
James Eli Adams. The interest is not limited to constructions of male gender roles, or to booklength studies: Miranda Gill wrote an article entitled “The Myth of the Female Dandy” (2007)
which discusses the elusive “lionne,” counterpart of the male dandy. The discussion of gender
and sexuality dynamics in dandyism is especially significant given the dandy’s role in blurring
traditional binary gender roles and traditional sexualities. In addition to this, the marked
misogyny in general in dandyism should not go unnoticed. However, this thesis will deal very
little with gender and sexuality concerns regarding the dandy, except inasmuch as the dandy
employs them as part of his ironic and satirical commentary of the society which he
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simultaneously leads, follows, and mocks. Neither of the two primary dandies looked at in this
thesis, Barbey or Baudelaire, was homosexual or especially ‘metrosexual.’ In addition to this, my
comparison with the ancient Stoics leaves little room for discussion on gender because the
ancient Stoic texts that I look at are all composed by males in a male-dominated era. These texts
deal very little with matters of gender because for those ancient Stoics, being a male
automatically entailed a sort of freedom.
Following a similar vein as my study, David Mazella’s recent book, The Making of
Modern Cynicism (2007), traces the evolution of Cynicism up to the present day. In his final
chapter, “Cynicism and Dandyism,” (176-214) Mazella argues that Cynicism is prominent in
modern dandyism. Though we follow parallel trajectories, I cannot rely overmuch on Mazella’s
criticism for this study because the late Roman Stoics to whom I will refer downplayed their
associations with Cynicism (Sellars 59). As such, his study is limited in its ability to consider
neo-stoicism outside of a cynical context.
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Chapter Overviews
Chapter One briefly outlines dandyism, from its British roots to its mid-century presence in
France. This chapter looks at two genealogies of the dandy: the first is traditionally imposed on
the dandy by his critics and is based on a history of fops, macaronis, muscadins, and the like; the
second genealogy was created by the dandy himself, and features much more illustrious names
from the annals of history and the dandy’s claim to Stoicism. The continuities and discontinuities
of Stoic philosophy in modern dandyism will be discussed here vis-à-vis three perspectives
already taken on the subject: religious, historical, and aesthetic. Chapter Two presents historical
context, insomuch as it foregrounds the conditions of Modernity that produced both a
‘therapeutic’ neo-stoic response on the one hand, and also a specifically ironic reaction on the
other. This context situates dandyism between neo-stoicism and irony in order to show how the
dandy adopted ancient Stoic influence and also how they manipulated it. Chapter Three analyzes
this adaptation. I offer a reading of the ironic appropriation of ancient Stoic emotion theory, as it
pertains to impressions, judgment and rationality, and preferred indifferents. I move to illustrate
the dandy’s inversion of and diversion from the ingredients forming ancient Stoic apatheia,
producing instead a modern apathy. In conclusion, I trace the relationship between this apathy
and modern ennui, reading ennui as the modern correlative to the ancient Stoic eudaimonia.
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Chapter One: Locating Ancient Stoicism in Modern Dandyism
1.1. The Beginning: Beau Brummell and the ‘Fop’ Genealogy
In the beginning, there was Beau Brummell. He not only created the practice of dandyism, he
epitomized it (Dandyism 43). He was the first dandy to mesmerize his contemporaries and he had
a specific allure that charmed his generation and beyond. He was born in 1778 into a middleclass family in England and was educated at Eton and Oxford. Though he was not technically
aristocratic by blood, Brummell’s status as a commoner was nominal. He was relatively high in
terms of class status and wealth, but throughout his life he would continually deny that he came
from a family of any distinction at all (Moers 18), perhaps because he thought this garnered him
even more distinction by having sprung from nothing. Brummell is famous for two things: first,
he revolutionized and reformed English fashion (Laver 9), and second, he was wholly invested
and reportedly charming in his insolence. The two go hand in hand, as his reformations to dress
were so radical as to be brazen, but nevertheless caught on. His impertinence was legendary and
he offended at least as many individuals as he charmed. For a while he was the favourite of the
King, but his social prominence was not due to this fact alone, and in any case, this friendship
did not last. Eventually, he fell out of favour, as the following apocryphal story tells: one night,
Brummell overstepped his familiarity with the King, telling him, “Wales, ring the bell.” The
King could not in good standing let such a slight go unpunished, and from then on their
friendship was finished (Moers 22; Dandyism 62). Whether or not this anecdote is true, it is in
line with Brummell’s fabled impertinence. The dandy created his own vision of the world, in
which he himself was the ruler supreme. Whether he overstepped boundaries seems to have been
a matter of opinion, depending on whom he offended.
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In 1816, having long since fallen out of favour and amassed huge debts from gambling,
Brummell fled to France to escape his creditors. He lived out the rest of his days in Calais,
degenerating into madness. It was a tragic end for a once celebrated individual. He remains the
pearl of dandyism as the inventor of the practice, though it would continue to take on new forms
long after his demise. That said, Brummell actually did little to advance the theory of dandyism
for his followers, practically speaking. He did not leave written records on how to conduct
oneself or what constituted a dandy demeanour. Instead, he led by example: his life is the best
example of dandyism, though the only remnants of this are legendary anecdotes in his
contemporaries’ works, a few biographies, and the Brummelliana edited by William Hazlitt,
which appeared soon after he fled to France in 1816.
The Brummelliana is a collection of sayings supposedly uttered by Beau Brummell,
which were printed and reprinted in England, and also refers to any apocryphal story attributed to
him. The following is an example, drawn from a May 1825 article in the London Magazine,
entitled “Examination of a Young Pretender to Fashion.” It recounts the following story:
When Brummell fell into disgrace, he devised the starched neckcloth with the design of
putting the Prince’s neck out of fashion, and of bringing his Royal Highness’ muslin, his
bow, and wadding into contempt. When he first appeared in this stiffened cravat, tradition
says that the sensation in St. James’s street was prodigious; dandies were struck dumb
with envy, and washerwomen miscarried. No one could conceive how the effect was
produced, - tin, card, a thousand contrivances were attempted, and innumerable men cut
their throats in vain experiments; the secret, in fact, puzzled and baffled everyone, and
the poor dandy L…d died raving mad of it; his mother, his sister, and all his relations
waited on Brummell, and on their knees implored him to save their kinsman’s life by the
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explanation of the mystery; but the beau was obdurate, and L. miserably perished (quoted
in Godfrey, 21).
Such anecdotes, truthful or not, circulated widely, and are a testament to the effect of Brummell
on his contemporaries.
Brummell’s first biographer was Captain William Jesse, whose book The Life of George
Brummell, Esq., Commonly Called Beau Brummell appeared in 1844. Captain Jesse had spent
most of his life outside of England and met Brummell in Calais in 1832. Jesse was apparently
entranced and spent years compiling information on the dandy (Moers 22). Jules Barbey
d’Aurevilly exchanged letters with Jesse while writing his own biography of Brummell, “Du
Dandysme et de Georges Brummell,” which appeared in 1845 in French. Both of these texts
were instrumental in setting down the life and practices of the original dandy and in separating
the dandy from his predecessors.
Much, though certainly not all, of the criticism that the dandies suffered came because of
the ‘genealogy’ ascribed to them by their contemporaries, which included numerous examples of
types of men who similarly wished to perfect a certain – notably fashionable – persona. These
include, but are not limited to, the fop, the macaroni, the muscadin, and the incroyable (Moers
11; Laver 9; Tuite 147). These incarnations can be distilled to and identified by surface criteria
(Tuite 147). They are especially known for the extremity of their mannerisms and their singular
styles of dress. As a result they are made out to be superficial, shallow beings, and for the most
part they did not aspire to any higher aims than the perfect coif or outfit. The fop was a British
gentleman during the seventeenth-century renowned (and ridiculed) as a slave to fashion; this
definition suits the macaroni too, who followed in the eighteenth-century (Laver 9). The
muscadins and incroyables appeared immediately following the French Revolution. These last
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held tightly to the remaining class distinctions still available via garments, but suffered great
scorn and were a short-lived phenomenon.
These figures are supposed to be the nineteenth century dandy’s precursors, and this fact
would change only with the publication of Barbey’s “Du Dandysme et de Georges Brummell” in
1844 (Humphreys 64), in which Barbey specifically tells his readers not to confound the dandy
with previous fashion types (Dandyism 41). On the surface, the comparison might seem right:
broadly, dandyism involved extremely refined mannerisms, cold and calculated reactions, an
enviable wardrobe, and a delicate balance of pleasing and shocking an audience. However,
despite sharing several features, the dandies of the nineteenth century are quite different from
their supposed kin, not least because of some major socio-cultural events which separate them.
As a result of cultural shifts like the French Revolution and the advent of industrialization, men’s
fashion took a decidedly more practical turn. ‘The great renunciation’ is the term for the
departure of men’s fashion from ostentatious ornamentation to simpler styles, because
“[e]laborate and modish male dress was perceived as symptomatic of corruption, tyranny and
foreign attitudes, while plainer male dress was heralded as an emblem of liberty, parliamentary
democracy, enterprise, virtue, manliness, and patriotism” (Steele 98-99, quoted in Hammill 27).
‘Quieter’ attire took over, which the dandy mastered – in his own way. Of course, he still
imposed distinctions, even within this less gaudy style, and as such was treated as the latest
embodiment of fashion victim by his critics. But while it might still be tempting to relegate him
to the ranks of the fops, it should be noted that the fops themselves would have quite rejected
him.
Even comparing the fops and the dandies in purely aesthetic terms, which is supposed to
be their main correlation, would still show considerable differences. Before Beau Brummell,
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men’s clothing was at least as decorated as a lady’s gown. Men wore powdered wigs, rouge, and
bright colours – generally ‘flamboyant’ costumes, by today’s standards. In contrast,
dandyism is a critical component of the so-called reform of masculine dress that emerged
in the wake of the French Revolution. The mode that dandyism is said to have reformed
is the macaroni style, at its heights in the 1770s, characterized by excessive face and hair
powder, bag wigs and hair extensions (Tuite 147).
Preferring to use subtle details to show his personal refinement, the dandy did not take part in
such gaudy displays as his predecessors. In his preface to Dandyism, Quentin Crisp tells us that
Brummell typified this move towards simplicity. Crisp says that “[Brummell’s] object gradually
came to be to represent correctness in dress without ostentation, cleanliness without scent,
originality without caprice, and superiority of manner without undue seriousness” (8). George
‘Beau’ Brummell’s wardrobe was revolutionary in that it was modelled on the distinctly less
ornate and less ‘high-brow’ clothing choices of a country gentleman: knee-high boots, breeches,
a waistcoat and a cravat (Laver 9).
Some critics have gone so far as to say that “we shall never understand dandyism unless
we realize that whatever else it was it was the repudiation of fine feathers” (Laver 9), a thought
which some dandies seem to echo. Barbey quotes Brummell as having said “Pour être bien mis,
il ne faut pas être remarqué” (“Du Dandysme” 131)10 and recommending that clothes be worn
“comme s’ils étaient impondérables! Un Dandy peut mettre s’il veut dix heures à sa toilette, mais
une fois faite, il l’oublie. Ce sont les autres qui doivent s’apercevoir qu’il est bien mis” (“Du
Dandysme” 133)11. Working off – or perhaps playing off – of this notion of the secondary
importance of the exterior, Baudelaire stated that “le dandysme n’est même pas, comme
10

“To be well-dressed, you must not be noticed” (Dandyism52)
“As if they weighed nothing. A dandy may spend ten hours a day dressing, if he likes, but once dressed he thinks
no more about it. It is for others to notice that he is well dressed” (Dandyism53).
11
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beaucoup de personnes peu réfléchies paraissent le croire, un goût immodéré de la toilette et de
l’élégance matérielle. Ces choses ne sont pour le parfait dandy qu’un symbole de la supériorité
aristocratique de son esprit” (“Le Peintre” 560)12. Baudelaire’s goal was to
be immaculate in dress and manners, to wear but the purest white linen, to keep his body
and his hands with the solicitous care of a priestess in a pagan temple was to him a form,
a symbol, of spiritual loftiness. Excess in dress, however, [Baudelaire] considered a sign
of bad taste, and hence contrary to the tenets of dandyism. There is a morality in dress as
in everything else, and its principle is to avoid immoderation and vanity (Rhodes 402).
Sima Godfrey notes that “while it is the first of these features – the visibly eccentric
manner of dress – that originally attracts superficial attention, […] it will be the latter aspect –
his impertinence, his sense of irony – that will earn him his true notoriety and lasting reputation”
(25). The dandy’s exterior appearance might be the most immediately evident and most often
identified element of dandies, but it is only one element of his persona. The dandy used his
cultivated exterior – for it was cultivated, though it was not gaudy – in order to imitate a certain
social class and inflict upon it his acid wit, satirizing and ironizing. The dandy walks a very fine
line in society. He is able to seem to fit in, to set the trends even, but at the same time every
phrase he utters is charged with criticism for the very society he seems to personify. The dandy is
fascinating because of his quasi-treasonous dual nature: he is “not an anarchist who overthrows
rules of behaviour and discourse; rather, he exploits their logic in order to produce the
unexpected (an unexpected that conforms, however, to the rules of unexpectedness within that
system) and challenges their system from within” (Godfrey 28). This double agent relies on, and
yet consistently overthrows, societal precepts.
12

“Contrary to what a lot of thoughtless people believe, dandyism is not even an excessive delight in clothes and
material elegance. For the perfect dandy, these things are no more than the symbol of the aristocratic superiority of
his mind” (The Painter 37).
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1.2. In France: Barbey and Baudelaire
Having established that in the nineteenth century, even in its first incarnation of George ‘Beau’
Brummell, dandyism broke with previous conceptions of the fashionable man, it is now time to
turn to France and the changes that the practice underwent there. These changes include a
development of the theory of dandyism as distinct from its praxis by two individuals who were
notable dandies in their own rights, Jules Barbey d’Aurevilly and Charles Baudelaire.
The Barbeyan and Baudelairean dandies are a continuance of a theme first introduced by
Honoré de Balzac. His essay, Traité de la vie élégante, was originally published in the fashion
journal La Mode in 1830 in five instalments. The Traité contains a series of aphorisms and short
explanations on stylish lifestyle. It includes a fictitious interview with the ultimate dandy
himself, Beau Brummell, in exile in Calais, but it mainly degrades his ‘false’ aristocracy and
makes light of the aging beau. The Traité de la vie élégante essentially introduced the English
dandy to French society, and planted some integral seeds for later French dandyism to appear in
both fiction and reality. However, the Traité de la vie élégante remains only a stepping off point
for dandyism and does not figure as a main text in this thesis because it does not have the same
impetus as Barbey’s and Baudelaire’s texts who wanted to make dandyism ‘academic.’ Balzac
often seems to poke fun at dandyism instead of elevating it. By contrast, Barbey and Baudelaire
both glimpsed something more substantial in dandyism.
The primary dandy texts examined in this thesis include Jules Barbey d’Aurevilly’s “Du
Dandysme et de Beau Brummell” (1845) and Baudelaire’s essay “Le Peintre de la vie moderne”
(1863). Though less than one hundred pages combined, “Du Dandysme et de Beau Brummell”
and “Le Peintre de la vie moderne” changed the face of dandyism. They sought to redeem
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dandyism from its critics and show that it was a viable and even respectable object of study. For
Barbey and Baudelaire, dandyism is not a passing phase or trend, nor a youthful misconception.
It is an ethically and aesthetically valid lifestyle, of which they are the only critics to have
compounded this “science of manners” (Natta 17) into a theory. Spear-heading the projects of
theorization and elevation of the dandy, Barbey and Baudelaire can be said to have been integral
to the “transformation from a mindless model of vanity to a model of the repressed dreamer and
intellectual rebel that separates earlier interpretations of the dandy from more modern ones”
(Godfrey 27). Together, they “transformed dandyism into a disciplined exercise in thought and
style” (Humphreys 64). This theoretical work would be later picked up by Albert Camus in “The
Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt” (1956) and Jean Baudrillard, who mentions the dandy’s
aesthetic nihilism in Simulacra and Simulations (XVIII: On Nihilism) (1981).
Jules Amadée Barbey was born in 1808 and throughout his long life was known as a
great dandy himself, not just as a theorist of dandyism. He was also a journalist. He experienced
a Catholic revelation and conversion at mid-century, but continued to cultivate the image of a
dandy through his mannerisms and often flamboyant clothing choices. He was most influential
during the Second Empire (Moers 266). Most of his literary fame is due to novels such as Les
Diaboliques (1874), published nearly thirty years after “Du Dandysme et de Georges Brummell.”
Barbey conducted extensive research to write “Du Dandysme et de Georges Brummell,”
including corresponding with Brummell’s English biographer, Captain Jesse (Moers 259). A
shorter version was supposed to have appeared in the Revue des Deux Mondes but was rejected
(Moers 259). It was also rejected for the women’s fashion magazine Le Moniteur de la Mode
because it was “too metaphysical” for the mostly female audience (Garelick 20). As the essay
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grew longer, those versions were also rejected by other newspapers and journals. “Du Dandysme
et de Georges Brummell” was eventually self-published in 1845 as a small book.
Barbey’s anecdotal text focuses on Brummell. “Du Dandysme et de Georges Brummell”
is filled with anecdotes of the original dandy and lengthy footnotes. Rhonda Garelick credits
Barbey with moving dandyism “away from its British, novelistic roots toward its later French
life as an aesthetic and philosophical movement” (Garelick 9). This book-length essay is hard to
qualify in terms of genre: it floats between “history, biography, autobiography, memoir, eulogy,
jeremiad, gossip column, satire, tragic tale […] as if genre were for Barbey a matter of tint rather
than structure” (Feldman 55). Barbey’s is the first serious study of dandyism; Balzac’s treatise
had been a series of questionably inflected representations, and other fictional manifestations
were merely literary explorations within a set frame. It is especially notable that Barbey
recognizes the dandy’s anti-establishment nature, thereby hinting at his ironic stature. Barbey
calls dandyism “une révolution individuelle contre l’ordre établi” (“Du Dandysme” 112)13. This
translates into “Barbey [being] the first to define the dialectic dependence of the dandy on a
society whose conventions and values he seeks to undermine” (Godfrey 28).
Baudelaire’s text, Le peintre de la vie moderne, appeared in Le Figaro in three parts in
1863. Baudelaire’s personal history is perhaps more well-known than that of Barbey. Born in
1821, his father died when he was a young boy and his mother remarried the following year to a
military man by the name of Aupick. Though Baudelaire would forever idolize his mother, he
was less than enthused about his stepfather. Baudelaire displayed behaviour that his family
considered ‘troubling,’ such as frequenting less than desirable hangouts in Paris and spending
rather too much money. As a disciplinary measure, Aupick sent Baudelaire far outside of Paris
on a voyage to India in order to hopefully ‘cure’ him. It did not work. Later attempts to control
13

“the revolt of the individual against the established order” (Dandyism 33)
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his spending included a court order which apparently produced no change beyond adding
resentment to the budding dandy. Over time, Baudelaire’s dandy tastes developed from youthful
trends to serious-minded social critiques as he toned down his style from the red cravat to the
black suit which for him carried “an ironic, even subversive connotation” (Lehmann 31).
While Baudelaire’s dandyism has received much more critical attention than Barbey’s,
Baudelaire was importantly inspired by Barbey’s dandy. Rather than evoke the English Regency
dandyism of Beau Brummell, Baudelaire wanted to unite the figure of the dandy with the figure
of the artist. Ellen Moers suggests that it was Barbey’s dandy which allowed him to do this. In
the Salon de 1846, Baudelaire wrote, “[e]n relisant le livre Du Dandysme, par M. Jules Barbey
d’Aurevilly, le lecteur verra clairement que le dandysme est une chose moderne et qui tient à des
causes tout à fait nouvelles” (“Le Peintre” 260).14 This emphasis on the currency and newness in
Barbey’s text was in line with Baudelaire’s idea to bring dandyism into focus as a specific
relationship to the present. He considered art to be the epitome of this relationship as a meeting
of permanent and impermanent. As the creator of this art, the artist was fundamentally situated in
its immediate present. This allowed Baudelaire to superimpose his own version of newness onto
the dandy: the concept of the artist (Moers 274). It is no accident that “Le Peintre” also features
Baudelaire’s definition of Modernity as “le transitoire, le fugitif, le contingent, la moitié de l’art
dont l’autre moitié est l’éternel et l’immuable” (“Le Peintre” 553)15 – for Baudelaire, the dandy
and the artist are the men of Modernity.
Though there are scattered references to dandies and dandyism in Baudelaire’s journals,
letters and essays, such as the “Salon of 1846,” it is never directly in his poetry. “Le Peintre de la
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“in rereading the book On Dandyism, by Mr. Jules Barbey d’Aurevilly, the reader will clearly see that dandyism is
a modern thing and attached to very new causes” (my translation).
15
“the transient, the fleeting, the contingent; it is one half of art, the other half being the eternal and the immovable”
(The Painter 17)
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vie moderne” is the only work in which Baudelaire fully expands his views about dandyism
(Moers 276). Like Barbey’s text, Baudelaire’s text too seems to evade conventional genre
boundaries as it encompasses biography, art criticism, social criticism, handbook, and manifesto.
The bulk of “Le Peintre de la vie moderne” focuses on art criticism and the works of the painter
Constantin Guys. It also includes Baudelaire’s seminal definition of Modernity. Only a small
section is devoted to describing the dandy, and while inspired by Barbey’s dandy, it moves
beyond it. Baudelaire’s text does not feature Beau Brummell, because to Baudelaire dandyism
had expanded beyond the individual: the dandy is no longer a man “but a concept rich in
linguistic – rather than specifically historical – associations” (Moers 276). Baudelaire’s dandy is
a revolutionary who made his life art, intent on forging a heroism of modern life.

1.3. “As Alcibiades” - A Genealogy for Dandies, by Dandies
As they fostered and developed dandy theory, Barbey and Baudelaire made several assertions
about the nature of dandyism, as seen above. One of the most intriguing assertions they both
articulate is the affinity between dandyism and ancient Stoicism. Those references will be
articulated here for presentation as part of a larger personal genealogy project which the dandy
put forth to counter the initial (false) genealogy expressed by his contemporaries. Far from
thinking themselves akin to fops, the Barbeyan and Baudelairean dandies had much loftier
expectations, as will be shown below.
I first presented a genealogy that consisted of fops, muscadins, and macaronis in
connection with George Brummell. That genealogy was imposed on the dandy by his
contemporaries and remains for the most part the same in today’s common cultural conceptions,
though I and others (Tuite, Laver) have suggested many reasons why it was not illustrative of the
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dandy’s true form. Here, I offer a radically different genealogy, one proposed by the dandies
themselves. This genealogy consists primarily of great ancestors, traced back to “César, Catalina,
Alcibiade” (“Le Peintre” 559). Proud precursors to a proud phenomenon, Karen Humphries
suggests that this history is a consequence of the fact that “a genealogy of heroes is regenerated
in times of crisis and carries the Promethean torch” (Humphreys 65). After the Revolution social
roles were no longer well-defined and the dandy sought to capitalize on this by writing himself a
grandiose history to show where he aligned himself in the grander scheme. Baudelaire had the
highest hopes for his dandyism:
The heroism of life, as he conceived it, made up of beauty and nobility, that was the
distinctive characteristic he sought in the dandy’s life, as he found it in the lives of those
he considered prototypes of his hero: Chateaubriand, Delacroix, Alcibiades, and Caesar:
the great Caesar, in whom Baudelaire beheld the supreme ideal of the perfect dandy, who
was as much concerned over his immaculate appearance as over his dictatorship who was
powerful, brave, and great of heart; who united in him beauty, glory, and refinement; who
was greater than his victories, and whose death was on a par with his life. Baudelaire’s
dandyism, we see, aimed very high. Whatever were his failings, he tried to extract from
life its epic grandeur (Rhodes 403)
But Caesar, Catalina and Alcibiades are not the only figures from antiquity that the dandy
drew on. Barbey also said “si un dandy était éloquent, il le serait à la façon de Périclès” (“Du
Dandysme” 120)16. More importantly, he called the dandies “stoïciens du boudoir” (“Du
Dandysme” 148)17 who routinely cultivated “une stoïque toilette” (“Du Dandysme” 151)18,
adding that the greatest dandy was Socrates’ student Alcibiades (“Du Dandysme” 166, Barbey
16

“Were a dandy to be eloquent, he would speak like Pericles” (Dandyism 42)
“stoics of the boudoir” (Dandyism 64)
18
“dressed stoically” (Dandyism 66).
17
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78). Baudelaire intimates that “on voit que, de certains côtés, le dandysme confine au
spiritualisme et au stoïcisme” (“Le Peintre” 560).19 Though these are the most concrete
assertions of Stoicism, the dandy also makes ample performative use of ancient Stoic
philosophy. In the following examples, it is clear that the dandy’s approach to Stoicism is in
terms of their most well-known ethics, the feature that we said survived most wholly into
Modernity – their approach to the sentiments and self-control.
In this vein, Baudelaire cites a key dandy mantra of perinde ac cadaver (“Le Peintre”
560)20, a Christian mantra inspired by asceticism and the Stoics. He goes on to expound on the
dandy’s “attitudes toujours calmes mais révélant la force” (“Le Peintre” 561)21 and his “air froid
qui vient de l’inébranlable résolution de ne pas être ému” (“Le Peintre” 561).22 Barbey, for his
part, called the dandies “dieux aux petits pieds – qui veulent toujours produire la surprise en
gardant l’impassibilité” (“Du Dandysme” 119),23 citing the practice’s “calme antique” (“Du
Dandysme” 119), and quoted Machiavelli’s maxim with regards to them: “le monde appartient
aux esprits froids” (“Du Dandysme” 122)24. Likewise, “si on était passionné, on serait trop vrai
pour être Dandy” (“Du Dandysme” 126)25, because the dandy is like “une pierre qui attire la
mousse, sans se laisser pénétrer par la fraîcheur qui la couvre ” (“Du Dandysme” 140)26. He was
capable of giving looks in which “ses yeux sagaces savaient se glacer d’indifférence sans mépris,
comme il convient à un Dandy consommé” (“Du Dandysme” 134)27. There are many more
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“in certain respects comes close to spiritualism and to stoicism” (The Painter 38).
“as a corpse” (The Painter 38)
21
“that calmness revealing strength in every circumstance” (The Painter 40)
22
“cold exterior resulting from an unshakeable determination to remain unmoved” (The Painter 40).
23
“miniature gods, who always try to create surprise by remaining impassive” (Dandyism 42)
24
“the world belongs to the cool of head” (Dandyism 45)
25
“Passion is too true to be dandyesque” (Dandyism 47)
26
“the stone that draws to itself the moss and is unpenetrated by the coolness of its covering” (Dandyism 58)
27
“glacial indifference without contempt, as becomes a consummate Dandy” (Dandyism 54)
20
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references besides these. Clearly, there exists an important rhetoric of impassivity within
dandyism which does seem to be inspired by ancient Stoic emotion philosophy.
As stated in the Introduction, there is a semantic shift of the word ‘Stoic’ from its original
to the present day. For the most part, ‘stoic’ today has been distilled to refer to only controlled
emotional comportment. While a ‘stoic’ response in the nineteenth century means a measured
and passion-free response just as it did in the second century B.C.E., in Greco-Roman times it
meant a great deal more than that; it also referred to a certain relationship to Nature, to God, and
to community which does not necessarily translate into the nineteenth century. Generally, the
inclination is to assume that when ‘stoic’ occurs in dandyist texts it is only in reference to this
narrower contemporary meaning of the word. However, there is reason to believe that there is
more to the comparison than meets the eye. Indeed, there are divergent stances or perspectives
within the critical literature on dandies regarding how, if at all, dandyism intersects with ancient
Stoicism.
The texts I will be using to explore this Stoic influence will be a variety from the Roman
Imperial period, primarily Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius. Reference to the actual
practices of the Stoics is paramount in the face of the casual twists employed by both the neostoics and their ironists, the dandies. Stoic philosophy began with Zeno around 300 BCE.
Borrowing primarily from the Cynics and Platonic philosophy, he began his own school, which
soon became one of the dominant Hellenistic philosophies. Ancient Stoicism lasted over five
hundred years, travelling from ancient Athens to Rome, with its influence resonating much
further outward. While the Stoics held views on subjects as diverse as psychology and medicine
to astrology and metaphysics, they are best known for their work on ethics. This is probably
because most of the extant texts we have from the Stoics are from the later Roman adherents
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from the first and second centuries A.D., including the writings of Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, and
Marcus Aurelius, whose works focused primarily on personal conduct, morality, and virtue.
Continually read and reread up to the current day with far-reaching influence over the centuries,
these texts have led to an idea of Stoicism as a specifically ethics-based philosophy. That said, it
is important to remember that these second-century writers represent only a later account of
ancient Stoicism that is primarily concerned with ethics; “in fact, much of the surviving material
actually by Stoics is what might be called practical ethics, not articulation of doctrine” (Schofield
253).
As mentioned, the three main ancient Stoic texts to be addressed in this chapter are
Epictetus’ Enchiridion, Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations, and Seneca’s Letters from a Stoic.
Epictetus was a freed slave from Anatolia who lived from C.E. 55 to 135. He himself did not
leave records, but one of his pupils, Arrian, set down his teachings in the Discourses and
Enchiridion, also known as the Manual. His Stoicism is notable for the influence of other
philosophies upon it, such as Platonic and Socratic theories. Marcus Aurelius was born in C.E.
121. He was the adopted son of Aurelius Antoninus, who had been adopted as Hadrian’s heir. He
ruled jointly as Roman Emperor from 161, and alone from 169 until his death in 180. He spent
much of his reign campaigning in the Danube region. While on campaign, he set down his own
thoughts and reflections in his Meditations. Seneca was a Roman statesman, philosopher, and
playwright with a tumultuous life. He lived from around 4 B.C.E. to 65 C.E. and was plagued by
ill health for most of his life. He was originally from Cordoba in Spain though quickly rose to
prominence at Rome, even acting as a tutor to the emperor Nero. Though he was sentenced to
death by multiple Roman emperors, Seneca managed to escape this sentence by taking exile in
Corsica until he was eventually ordered by Nero to commit suicide. The Letters from a Stoic is
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the record of his didactic correspondence with his younger student Lucilius (Penguin
Introductions).
I have chosen examples from the late Roman Imperial period because of their emphasis
on ethical considerations. The ethical bent presents the best parallel for my thesis because of the
performative aspects of dandyism, that is, the consideration of conduct. In addition, the late
Roman models of Stoicism employ a ‘handbook’ or ‘advice’ style of transmission, similar to the
instructive handbook forms of the dandies. I hope to show that aspects of ancient Stoicism,
specifically their philosophy of emotion, was present in the nineteenth century – a large enough
leap in itself, as critics like Becker argue strongly that ancient Stoic influence and neo-stoicisms
are all but absent after the Enlightenment, leaving the nineteenth and twentieth centuries bereft
of Stoic influence.

1.4. Continuities and Discontinuities
Few critical texts, as I have said, have made reference to the use of ancient Stoicism in
dandyism, and none have considered the relation ironically. Still, I am not the first to connect the
dandies to the ancient Stoics. Though some literary critics have also noticed affinities, often it is
merely to dismiss it as a misguided allusion, or on regrettable occasions as downright false. I
have chosen to divide these critical perspectives into three categories which consist of a religious
reading, a historical reading, and an aesthetic reading. The religious reading assents to the
presence of ancient Stoicism in dandyism because of ancient Stoicism’s influence on and
subsequent presence in Catholicism. The historical reading rejects the presence of ancient
Stoicism in dandyism on the grounds that the social and political contexts of the modern world
are too different to justify the existence of a philosophy of the ancient world in the same way as
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it once existed. The final aesthetic reading surmises a relationship between the nineteenthcentury dandy and the Hellenistic philosopher in terms of a shared or similarly artful way of life,
or an “aesthetics of existence.” The following sections will summarize these approaches.

The Religious Approach
The religious approach, typified here by literary critic Ernest Raynaud, represents a complicit
acquiescence to the presence of ancient Stoicism in nineteenth century dandyism. Raynaud wrote
Baudelaire et la religion du Dandysme in 1918, and in this text, Raynaud quotes Baudelaire on
the dandy’s coolness and desire to overcome emotional inconstancy and assents to the idea that
these are based in ancient Stoicism. He claims the dandy’s goal was to ‘aspire to the sublime’
and transcend trends, becoming a superior being in every external way: dress, manners, social
circles, etc. Raynaud says that the dandy dogma is similar to Stoicism in that it focuses on
staving off “les passions vulgaires pour conquérir l’Insensibilité” (19)28. This strictness translated
into an excessive refinement of costume, sociability, and labour, among others, and in particular
into the refinement of emotional response. Raynaud’s reading is problematic because he fails to
adequately consider the contextual influences specific to the nineteenth century. When
addressing the Stoic asceticism of the dandy, Raynaud’s text has a different goal in mind, and his
motivations soon become clear. What Raynaud ultimately has in mind is setting up a Christian,
specifically Catholic, Baudelaire. Leaning on certain Stoic principles that, according to Lawrence
Becker, were translated into the Catholic Church in the fourth and fifth centuries C.E. (3),
Raynaud creates an image of Baudelaire as a well-practicing, ascetic Catholic. Raynaud morphs
Baudelaire’s asceticism and makes him a quintessential Catholic poet. Raynaud ends up with an
almost painfully austere Baudelaire, claiming him as a morally upright man who avoided not
28

“the lowly passions to attain Indifference” (my translation).
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only establishments of ill repute but even conversations which took on a lecherous tone, and
whose only relation to Jeanne Duval – his purported mistress – was apparently one of chivalrous
and conscientious charity.
This view is problematic based on the knowledge available today on Baudelaire’s life.
Raynaud’s text was written in 1918, only about fifty years after the death of Baudelaire. It is
possible that biographical information available today was not available then, and also that the
more unsavoury parts of his life might have been deliberately avoided at the time. Still, the fact
remains that Raynaud manipulates the influence of ancient Stoicism in Baudelaire’s dandyism
with a heavy Christian inflection. While Raynaud does nominally agree with an ancient Stoic
influence on Baudelaire, his work diverges from mine in that it does not take the dandy’s
multiplicitous nature and tendency towards social commentary into consideration – two factors
which profoundly influence the dandy’s use of ancient Stoicism. All in all, this book is important
because Raynaud makes the first constructive use of Baudelaire’s allusions to Stoicism.
However, it is my opinion that Raynaud only tacitly agrees with the Stoic influence in order to
get to another matter, which is Baudelaire’s relation to Catholicism.

The Historical Approach
The historical approach refutes the influence of ancient Stoicism in nineteenth century dandyism
by saying that the differences between the ancient and the modern world are too vast for a
comparable version of Stoicism to exist between the two. The critic that I will address here is
Marie-Christine Natta, who in her book La Grandeur sans convictions (1991) considers several
different dandies, including both Barbey and Baudelaire. In this book, among many other
pertinent arguments, she analyses the dandy’s claim to Stoicism and identifies it as false, or at
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least an exaggeration. It is my opinion that the dandy’s precision in all other facets of his life
necessitates a further reading than Natta’s approach on the subject of his Stoicism.
Natta represents those who reject the dandy’s take on ancient Stoicism as nothing other
than false. La Grandeur sans convictions contains a chapter devoted to the dandy’s Stoicism
entitled “Sourire sous la morsure du renard,” named with Baudelaire’s own phrasing (“Le
Peintre” 560)29, Natta argues that Barbey and Baudelaire have misinterpreted Stoicism and
though they claim to be following its doctrine, they have fundamentally missed the mark. She
identifies a few main reasons why they have understood Stoicism incorrectly.
With her first line, it seems as if her argument is perfectly in line with my own; she says,
“Le dandy est un illusionniste qui inverse les valeurs sociales, les ordres hiérarchiques, et fait de
la douleur de son ennui, non une faiblesse, mais une supériorité” (Natta 129)30. She continues,
also prefiguring my own analysis, that dandyism is a dazzling mask for psychological struggles
and interior pain. However, after these opening sentences, our views diverge. According to
Natta, the extent to which the dandy hopes to escape feeling is both inhuman and impossible,
meaning that dandyism has never actually been demonstrated because “aucun homme ne peut se
conformer en tout point et à tout moment à la secheresse de ses ‘lois rigoureuses’” (Natta 129)31.
She proceeds to give examples of how the dandies, regardless of how cold they may claim to be
are actually fairly loving. Natta says gestures such as Baudelaire anxiously inquiring after Jeanne
Duval’s health render his neo-stoicism unfaithful to such an extent that it nullifies the allusion to
ancient Stoicism. When the dandies do employ indifference, she says it is most often to cover
emotional scars, which is not at all the purpose of actual Stoicism. Actual Stoicism, she argues, is

29

“smiling […] under the bite of the fox” (The Painter 38)
“The dandy is an illusionist who inverts social values, hierarchies, and uses his painful ennui not as a weakness,
but a strength” (my translation).
31
“no man can conform at all times and in all actions to the coldness of his “rigorous laws”” (my translation).
30
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employed in rational choice and discretion with regards to emotion, which I do not contest. Thus,
because “cette maîtrise [des passions] vise des buts différents” (134)32, she concludes that the
dandy’s use of Stoicism is quite misguided.
les stoïciens écartent les passions jugées mauvaises, car elles détournent l’homme de la
saine nature. Les dandys les évitent car elles contrarient leur esthétique et les rendraient
vulnérables; et s’ils ne peuvent les éviter, ils les cachent derrière leur masque impassible;
or, l’idée du masque et de l’artifice est tout à fait étrangère au stoïcisme (Natta 134).33
Her argument, like mine, hinges on the context of Modernity: since the worldview has
shifted since antiquity and the dandies are no longer governed by a whole and harmonious world,
she says that the dandies have no hope of ever “être en accord avec l’ordre du monde” (135) 34 as
the ancient Stoics strove to be. She notes that the dandy has especially harsh beliefs particularly
towards Nature. It is true that Baudelaire routinely speaks in favour of artifice and makeup as
‘correctors’ for Nature’s faults. However, Natta believes this nullifies his claims to Stoicism:
“Tout son comportement est une protestation contre la société et contre la nature que les
stoïciens identifient à la raison” (Natta 135)35. Her argument is worth quoting at length:
Pour se rendre philosophe, dit Epictète, « il faut veiller, peiner, se séparer des siens,
souffrir les mépris d’un jeune esclave, être raillé par les premiers venus, avoir en tout le
dessous, dans les honneurs, dans les charges publiques, devant les juges et dans la
moindre affaire. Pèse tout cela si tu veux recevoir en échange l’impassibilité, la liberté, le
calme. Sinon n’approche pas, de peur que, comme les enfants, tu ne sois maintenant
32

“this mastery (of his passions) has a different goal” (my translation).
“The Stoics dismiss emotions judged as incorrect, because they divert man from his true nature. The dandies
avoid emotions because they are contrary to their aesthetic principles and would make them vulnerable; and if they
cannot avoid them, they hide them behind an impassive mask; and the idea of the mask is completely foreign to
Stoicism” (my translation)
34
“to be in accordance with the order of the world” (my translation)
35
“All his behaviour is a protest against the society and against the nature that the Stoics identified with reason” (my
translation).
33
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philosophe, plus tard précepteur, ensuite rhéteur, puis procurateur de César. Tout cela ne
s’accorde pas. Il faut que tu sois un seul homme, ou bon ou mauvais. Il faut cultiver, ou le
gouvernement de toi-même ou les choses du dehors, t’appliquer aux choses intérieures ou
aux choses extérieures, c’est-à-dire tenir le rôle de philosophe ou de particulier »
(Epictetus XXIX, 6-7). Imagine-t-on un instant le dandy accepter une infériorité social,
négliger l’opinion d’autrui, renoncer à toute forme de dilettantisme et au gouvernement
des choses extérieures? (Natta 135)36
She concludes forcefully : “Non, décidément, la résignation stoïcienne n’est pas une vertu dandy.
Le dandy ne se résigne pas, il s’oppose, certes avec détachement, en s’isolant, mais il
s’oppose” (Natta 135)37. Natta is definitely opposed to the notion of a truly Stoic dandy.
I must point out that I am not entirely in disagreement with Natta – the purpose of this
thesis is not to establish that the dandy is a perfect Stoic. Rather, I propose that the dandy is
approaching ancient Stoicism from an ironic point of view, which fundamentally rearranges the
way critics should be in dialogue with ancient Stoicism’s influence in dandyism. Thus, stating
that the dandy was ‘wrong’ in his self-characterization as a Stoic is controversial. After all, the
dandy is renowned as one of the most careful constructors of identity. Given his laborious
concern with this construction of identity, I have to conclude that the dandy would not be so
careless or indeed reckless with his prize possession – himself – as to haphazardly choose a name
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“To become a philosopher, says Epictetus, you must be vigilant and struggle, separate yourself from your family,
suffer contempt like a young slave, be mocked by everyone, come last in everything, in honours, in public office,
before judges and in the smallest matters. Consider all of this if you want to receive indifference, freedom, and
peace in exchange. Otherwise, do not approach if you wish to be know a philosopher, now a tutor, then a rhetorician,
then a procurator under Caesar. These are not compatible. You must be only a man, good or bad. You must cultivate
either yourself or things exterior to yourself, apply yourself either to interior concerns or exterior ones, that is to say
the role of the philosopher or of the mundane” (Epictetus XXIX, 6-7). Imagine for a moment a dandy accepting an
inferior social position, ignoring the opinion of others, renouncing all forms of dilettantism and the curation of
exterior concerns?” (my translation).
37
“No, decidedly not, Stoic resignation is not a virtue possessed by the dandy. The dandy does not resign, he
opposes, certainly with detachment, in isolation, but he opposes” (my translation)
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with only the merest resemblance to his behaviour toward himself. Though Natta and I agree on
some points, I do not feel that she takes finer nuances of the dandy’s condition into proper
consideration.

The Aesthetic Approach
The final approach bears the most resemblance to my own thinking in that it productively relates
ancient philosophy to the nineteenth century. This section will focus on furthering a connection
made by Michel Foucault in order to discuss the similarities between the ethics of the subject in
cases of stylized selfhood in both the Roman Imperial period and nineteenth-century France by
the fact that they both subscribe to a stylized manner of living, what Michel Foucault terms an
“aesthetics of existence.” This concept first arises in a lecture series at the College de France in
1981-1982 entitled “The Hermeneutics of the Subject.” “The Hermeneutics of the Subject”
concentrates, broadly, on identity and self-construction, primarily using examples from Antiquity
and ancient philosophies, and led to the second and third volumes of The History of Sexuality. In
the lecture series, Foucault offers analyses of highly regulated forms of self-cultivation with
emphasis placed on the relationship of the self to the self, and the conscious regulation of
influences on the individual in order to construct an identity that is free of norms. He even goes
so far as to explicitly state that an ‘aesthetics of existence’ is shared between Antiquity and
dandyism (Hermeneutics 251) This section will focus on further exploring that connection and
its relevance via a comparison with another text by Foucault: an article from 1984 entitled “What
is Enlightenment?” which deals with a concept of reactivated active selfhood in relation to
Kant’s theories of Enlightenment and Baudelaire’s dandy.
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Foucault has applied the “aesthetics of existence” and the complementary self-cultivation
to his criticism to multiple epochs, citing a Herculean effort to know the self and live in an artful
way in each. In interviews, he noted that he considered three golden ages of self-cultivation: the
Greco-Roman period, the Renaissance, and nineteenth-century dandyism (“Genealogy of Ethics”
362). Each of these time periods are involved in trying to cultivate an art of living, which is “a
question of knowing how to govern one’s own life in order to give it the most beautiful possible
form (in the eyes of others, of oneself, and of future generations)” (“The Concern for Truth” 259)
via personally-developed ethics. Notably, each of these time periods involves the emancipation
of its members from over-arching structures and fairly radical socio-cultural change, such as the
Renaissance’s rediscovery of Greco-Roman philosophy and the transformations of arts, culture,
and science coming out of medieval times. Foucault says that “the theme of the return to the self
has undoubtedly been a recurrent theme in ‘modern’ culture since the sixteenth century”
(Hermeneutics 250). It is not a coincidence that “no secular books were more widely read during
the Renaissance than Cicero’s On Duties, the Letters and Dialogues of Seneca, and the Manual
of Epictetus” (“Stoicism in the Philosophical Tradition” 365). While Anthony A. Long calls
Stoicism the “least explicitly and adequately acknowledged influence on Western thought”
(“Stoicism in the Philosophical Tradition” 365), he cites its influence in the works of scholars as
diverse as Lipsius, Leibniz, Rousseau, Adam Smith, and Kant. Foucault posits that Stoicism
displays itself once again in the context of Modernity. He finds the influence most clearly on the
nineteenth century, saying:
a whole section of nineteenth-century thought can be reread as a difficult attempt, a series
of difficult attempts, to reconstitute an ethics and an aesthetics of the self. If you take, for
example, Stirner, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, dandyism, Baudelaire, anarchy, anarchist
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thought, etcetera, then you have a series of attempts that are, of course, very different
from each other, but which are all more or less obsessed by the question: is it possible to
constitute, or reconstitute, an aesthetics of the self? (Hermeneutics 251)
In the article “What is Enlightenment?” Foucault discusses the deep relation of the self
and implicitly, a reinvigoration of “aesthetics of existence”, in the dandy. Foucault uses
Baudelaire’s treatise, Le Peintre de la vie moderne, as a means to explain his views on the
Enlightenment and expand on a text by Immanuel Kant, a response written into a journal during
Kant’s early career. Foucault’s characterization of Baudelaire’s dandy echoes his
characterization of the Hellenistic philosophers, but he is careful to avoid placing too much
emphasis on the role of the Enlightenment as a magical moment of awakening for mankind.
While he acknowledges the Enlightenment as a period of perhaps great evolution and revolution,
he emphasizes that it is also merely one paradigm among many. That said, Foucault is attracted
by Kant’s description of Enlightenment as an “Ausgang” or “exit,” as “a process that releases us
from a state of tutelage or immaturity (Unmündigkeit). By tutelage he means a state of mind that
makes us accept someone else's authority” (Seppa, n.pag). It is only after having been
emancipated from an outside guiding force and autonomously using Reason that there is a
reactivation of subjectivity in the modern era. This reactivation entails a separation of the
dominant modes of subjection from the individual’s development of selfhood and an emphasis
on emancipation from blind obedience. Once separated from these exterior influences, the
subject must actively make his own truths.
In order to come to a definition of “aesthetics of existence,” I will first look at the social
milieu in which it developed. Greco-Roman philosophies, such as Stoicism, were greatly
concerned with ethics – that is, reasonable and moderate conduct – and while they had relatively
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few governing bodies concerned with legislating private behaviours, it was a personal duty to
conduct oneself in a mindful manner. To that end, the ancient’s relation to the self was
“intensified and valorized” (Cultivation of the self 43), and it is the intense personal relationship
which Foucault designates as one of the main subjects of ethical concentration. The
concentration is so great that it develops into the stylized creation of an ethical way of living.
Philosophy had long been the practice of an ‘art of living’, but it was during the late Roman
approach that it was canonized into an aesthetics of living where “the notion of exercising a
perfect mastery over oneself soon became the main issue” (Dreyfus 235). It began long before
Seneca or Epictetus approached the topic: Foucault says that the “aesthetics of existence”
emerged from Greek concepts, and gradually garnered more and more consideration until, by the
time it is elaborated by Seneca and Epictetus (Care of the Self 43), self-cultivation is the
disciplined development of “a code of conduct that revolves around the question of the self”
(Smart 210).
The emphasis on the cultivation of the self that Foucault finds in various authors from
Antiquity leads him to conclude that the real maxim of the Greco-Roman era was not gnothi
seauton, but rather, epimeleia heautou. Gnothi seauton translates to the well-known Delphic
principle “know thyself,” which doubtless has its merits, but Foucault places this second to
epimeleia heautou, which approximately means “care of the self” (“On the Genealogy” 359,
Care of the Self 43). The sentiment is Socratic, and appears in Plato’s Alcibiades as Socrates
explains to the youthful general that before presuming to rule others, one must learn to rule
oneself. As the principle of self-care grew from Greek origins to Roman elaborations, the focus
was on performing actions that all add up to produce a being whose every action is devoted to
complementing the self. Seneca wrote hundreds of letters to friends about the importance of
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cultivating the self, stressing that self-care requires more than a ‘general attitude.’ It requires
great focus and devotion. This is reflected in the word epimeleia, “a sort of work, an activity; it
implies attention, knowledge, and technique” (“On the Genealogy” 359), and also denotes
not just a preoccupation but a whole set of occupations; it is epimeleia that is employed in
speaking of the activities of the master of a household, the tasks of the ruler who looks
after his subjects, the care that must be given to a sick or wounded patient, or the honours
that must be paid to the gods or to the dead. With regard to oneself as well, epimeleia
implies a labour (Care of the Self 50).
The effort, curation, and overall emphasis on technique and craft in this passage belie the
ritualism and aestheticization that figures prominently in the Roman elucidation of selfcultivation and later versions. The line between ethics and aesthetics was blurred because the
Stoics “identified beauty (to kalon) to moral goodness (to agathon)” (Brilliant and Asmis n.pag.).
Aesthetic-ethic integration was furthered by “the integration, the intertwining of the practice of
the self with the general form of the art of living” (Hermeneutics 125). The Greco-Roman
philosophical obligation to observe and regulate the self was a monumental effort to not just
control but also construct the self, out of which “a whole art of self-knowledge developed, with
precise recipes, specific forms of examination, and codified exercises” (Cultivation of Self 58).
Studied self-care turned into self-cultivation. Over time, self-cultivation became more and more
regulated until it
took the form of an attitude, a mode of behaviour; it became instilled in ways of living; it
evolved into procedures, practices, and formulas that people reflected on, developed,
perfected, and taught. It thus came to constitute a social practice, giving rise to
relationships between individuals, to exchanges and communications, and at times even
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to institutions. And it gave rise, finally, to a certain mode of knowledge and to the
elaboration of a science (Care of the Self 45).
Ethics was heavily emphasized because the goal of philosophy was to learn to live well,
even to make life a work of art. The care and cultivation of the self was not legislatively
enforced, but available to each individual as a “principle of stylization of conduct for those who
wished to give their existence the most graceful and accomplished form possible” (Use of
Pleasure 250-251). But there is a major issue to address here: if Foucault is advocating for an
“aesthetics of existence” that can be paralleled between the Greco-Romans and the nineteenthcentury dandies, and allow members of both eras to create the self into a work of art, then the
differences between a Greek ‘aesthetics’ which is aligned with social and ethical practice must
be reconciled with a modern definition of aesthetics which has been technically split from moral
and ethical standards.
Andrew Thacker describes how the problematic treatment of aesthetics in Foucault’s
“aesthetics of existence” stems from the conflation of aesthetics and ethics implied therein. He
argues that “aesthetics” in the Greek sense is considerably different from “aesthetics” in a
modern, and specifically post-Kantian, sense. In the Greek sense, in which beauty could be
equated to what is morally good, aesthetics and ethics could be said to be closely tied. In the
modern sense, aesthetics has been separated from any practical office other than being itself; that
is, art and aesthetic judgments are autonomous from moral ones. These two definitions are quite
different. Therefore, turning one’s life into a work of art today means a considerably different
thing than in the Greek context, and it would be an anachronism to apply Greek aesthetics,
“intermeshed with social and ethical practices” today (14). Yet, Foucault constitutes the
‘aesthetics of existence’ as not “for, but in terms of, a contemporary situation,” (“Concern for
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truth” 263) and so Thacker asks a very pertinent question: “If the Greeks had an undissociated
sense of the aesthetic and the ethical life can we really look back to them as exemplars when our
senses of the ethical and aesthetic are so clearly divorced?” (14). Given this gap between the two
versions of “aesthetic,” Thacker proposes two options: the first being that Foucault was
attempting to define a modern “aesthetics of existence” based on Greek thought, and the second
being that Foucault was attempting a variation on Kantian aesthetics, based on a principle of
autonomy.
Thacker says that the Greek notion only works today if Foucault was imagining a future
state of aesthetics in which “the cognitive, the ethical, and the aesthetic, […] intermingle and
temper the other” (15). While these realms are currently treated as distinct, it is not unfeasible to
say that aesthetics will not always be viewed under the umbrella of Kantian aesthetic autonomy,
or that perhaps Foucault was seeking to redefine aesthetics in a non-Kantian way. Since under
the Kantian approach, art objects cannot have an ethical dimension, Foucault’s theory is
misplaced unless it can be contextualized by an approach which involves the negation of the
autonomy of the art objects or aesthetic judgment and inclusion of ethical consideration. I argue
that the differences between these definitions of aesthetics are substantial, and contribute to why
the dandy can only give an ironic portrayal of this ethics.
The examples that Foucault listed above, like Baudelaire, Nietzsche, and Schopenhauer,
sought to give their lives a beautiful form, but the determination to live beautifully within a
modern era will mean something different given the evolution of ‘aesthetics’ between GrecoRoman and modern times.
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A Different Approach
In sum, these approaches offered above – religious, historical, and aesthetic – are attempts to
unpack the relationship between ancient Stoicism and dandyism. While each offers special draws
or deterrents, my position is that none of these aforementioned approaches is adequate because
they do not consider the dandy’s neo-stoicism in light of his ironic imperative. My estimation is
that, because irony figures as such an important part of his definition and theorization, the
dandy’s neo-stoicism is also performed ironically.
The following chapter will address context in two ways. The first is the actual historical
context of the nineteenth century: addressing the political, social, and economic events of the
century in order to come to better understand the relation between the collective traumatic
experience of Modernity and the reactive neo-stoicism it inspired. Second, I will analyze the
extent to which those same modern preconditions inspired the modus operandi of the dandy:
irony.
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Chapter Two: Neo-Stoicism and Irony in Modernity
2.1 Historical Context: Instability
The nineteenth century was filled with social, political, and economic changes which, I will
argue, make it hardly surprising that a therapeutically-inclined philosophy like neo-stoicism
emerged: practicing regulation of emotions has continually offered solace to individuals
struggling through difficult times. In France, the long and bloody battle for power which had
begun with the French Revolution in 1789 continued into the nineteenth century. The turbulence
persisted in a series of Revolutions, Restorations, Empires, and Republics. The optimism which
had characterized the beginning of the century with the rise of Napoleon was soon followed by
the bitter disappointment of many of his followers after he crowned himself Emperor. With
Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo imminent, Louis XVIII of the House of Bourbon was briefly
restored to the throne in 1814, and then again more permanently in 1815. He ruled until his death
in 1824 and was succeeded by his brother, Charles X, who reigned until he was forced to
abdicate during the July Revolution in 1830. Louis-Philippe of the Orleans monarchy succeeded
him. Then, in 1848, Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, nephew of the original Napoleon, became the
first President of the République française. Shortly after, like his uncle, he declared himself
Emperor, ending the short-lived republic and instituting the Second French Empire. The Third
Republic began in 1871, after France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian war saw the downfall of
Napoleon III and his Empire. The Paris Commune lasted about two months and was
subsequently replaced by the presidency of Adolphe Thiers. Various presidents follow after
these, with varying degrees of stability. Add to this various wars – France invaded Spain in 1823
and took part in the Crimean War with England against Russia in 1854, not to mention the
Second Opium War in Beijing in 1860 and the Franco-Prussian War in 1871.The nineteenth
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century was, in France, arguably one of the most politically tumultuous in its history (see
Christophe Charle).
The background to all this political turmoil was rapid social and economic change. The
Industrial Revolution was in full swing by the mid-1800s. There was a surge in the population of
the city of Paris of labourers looking for somewhere to live and work. Insufficient understanding
of disease meant that illnesses spread quickly. Housing conditions were cramped and unsafe.
There was a lack of infrastructure, including proper sanitation, until conditions caught up in the
mid-nineteenth century. Work, if it could be found, was rarely at an adequate pay and still more
rarely safe. Workers’ riots were frequent and often violent. While a small section of the middle
classes, the bourgeoisie, was rising in wealth and power, there remained a gap between the
uppermost and lowest tiers of society. Most importantly, there was an increasing awareness of
this gap on all levels of society (Charle).
These are the conditions in which ‘Modernity’ blooms. As opposed to merely ‘modern,’
a term which was used variously well before the nineteenth century, ‘Modernity’ did not come
into usage until the works of Charles Baudelaire and his contemporaries (Delanty 3068). On a
fundamental level, Modernity typifies an experience of tension. The swirl of philosophies during
and after the Enlightenment era led to “the emergence of new modes of thought and
consciousness” (Delanty 3069). Between these new modes of existence there reigned
ambivalence. Multiplicity was rampant due to constantly shifting dynamics which forced ever
newer re-evaluations of the present moment and its relation to the past. These topics are explored
in Liah Greenfield’s new book entitled Mind, Madness and Modernity: The Impact of Culture on
Human Experience (2013) and Jerome Braun’s Psychological Aspects of Modernity (1993).
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But all these changes affected more than just the political and economic face of a country.
On a personal level, individuals lost a sense of balance as well, and “for close to five hundred
years […] have probably experienced modernity as a radical threat to their history and traditions”
(Berman 16). During the Middle Ages, constructions like the great chain of Being gave
individuals a sense of placement and purpose within a larger network. Once constructions like
these have been unravelled, the individual is placed in a precarious position, faced with
redefining himself as a self. As Charles Taylor details, “Modernity is not that form of life toward
which all cultures converge as they discard beliefs that held our forefathers back. Rather, it is a
movement from one constellation of background understandings to another, which repositions
the self in relation to others and the good” (“Two Theories of Modernity” 24). Repositioning is
not an easy feat, however; Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s A Letter is a condensed example of the
feelings elicited by Modernity. The only thing one could be certain of was that one could not be
certain of anything. In this unstable context, the individual has a new and as yet unformulated
relation to his surroundings and to himself. The relationship with the self intensifies because
“emerging out of these dynamics are self-transformative tendencies and a self-conscious
reflexivity” (Delanty 3069). Instability led to two responses: one could take comfort in a
philosophy with a strongly established connection to the self and little relation on external factors
for happiness or comfort, or one could embrace that instability.
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2.2 The Neo-stoic Response
As noted, the tendency in tracing ancient Stoic influence and neo-stoicisms is to leap from the
Enlightenment to the present day, ignoring any vestiges that may have appeared along the way.
Lawrence C. Becker, the author of A New Stoicism (1998), which advocates for the (slightly
modified) use of Stoic aspects in today’s society and argues that Stoicism has a place in the
present day and, indeed, is needed. But even Becker, capable of seeing the need for Stoicism
today, glosses over its presence in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He says that Stoicism
was basically effaced by “evangelical and imperial Christianity” (3) after five hundred years of
prominence in the Greek and Roman systems. The fragments of Stoicism that survived into the
Middle Ages were only in the way of “pastoral counselling, the military, and what then passed
for medicine and psychotherapy” (3). As a brief respite from Stoicism’s hibernation, Becker cites
an explosion of interest during the Renaissance, but is careful to note that it “bore only a strong
family resemblance to that [Stoicism] of Zeno and Chryssipus” (3). Small matter, Becker claims,
because the neo-stoic craze soon subsided and returned to a personal level of practice, if at all.
Throughout the eighteenth century, “we gradually abandoned our doctrine that the universe
should be understood as a purposive, rational being” (3), and in the nineteenth century, even the
few remaining vestiges in theological practice were discarded, apparently “largely due to the rise
of romanticism” (3). Becker says that it was the plethora of philosophies and intellectual
movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which
finally laid waste to our movement […] The social sciences bought the fact-value
distinction, and philosophy peddled it to them. Nonnaturalism arose, collapsed into
noncognitivism, and rose again as intuitionism and constructivism. Moral truth was given
a coherentist interpretation. Pluralism, relativism, and irony abounded, alongside various
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forms of dogmatism about natural duties and the intrinsic moral worth of human beings”
(3-4).
Becker concludes gloomily that the only remaining adherents to any kind of Stoicism today are
some soldiers, some logicians, and some (apparently nostalgic) Hellenists (4). If Becker is
arguing for a fairly strict and thorough rejuvenation of Stoic doctrine, then its revival during the
Renaissance was about as much of a complete manifestation as can ever have appeared since the
Greeks and Romans made use of it, given that Becker notes that a fairly fundamental part of it is
lost to us now since nature has ceased to be a necessarily rational or rationalizable factor.
I have quoted Becker at length because he represents a critical tendency on the subject of
neo-stoicism. Yet, I argue that there is a place for Stoic influence in the nineteenth century –
actually, that its presence is crucial. As an adaptable philosophy, ancient Stoicism and its many
neo-stoicisms have been present and have been impactful well after the fall of the Roman
Empire. That said, there is currently limited research available on the subject, with most major
criticism about Stoicism in modern eras stopping at the Renaissance and Reformation, as Becker
postulated. However, in 2012 Philosophic Pride: Stoicism and Political Thought from Lipsius to
Rousseau by Christopher Brooke came out which bridges at least as far as the eighteenth century.
Anthony A. Long is also a proponent of the idea that ancient Stoic influence exists across
multiple eras. He explains that the transference of Stoicism from its beginnings in Athens into
even the present day is actually very plausible because, he argues, any ethics-based philosophy
possesses an especially wide-ranging applicability. There is a distinct universality of the desire to
live in a meaningful way; that is, a search for a suitable ethics is ongoing and in constant flux,
and as such, ancient Stoic doctrine is revisited time and again. Long calls Stoicism the “least
explicitly and adequately acknowledged influence on Western thought” (“Stoicism in the
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Philosophical Tradition” 365), stating that it has taken many forms over the centuries. William
B. Irvine has identified other examples of neo-stoicisms, such as René Descartes’ solipsistic
philosophy, Schopenhauer’s nihilism, and Henry David Thoreau’s fiction (211). In fact, Irvine
even quoted Thoreau, who wrote in his journal that “Zeno the Stoic stood precisely in the same
relation to the world that I do now” (quoted in Irvine, 211). Domna Stanton finds a neo-stoicism
in Montaigne’s honnête homme which she then explicitly links to the dandy in The Aristocrat as
Art: A Study of the Honnête Homme and the Dandy in Seventeenth- and Nineteenth-Century
French literature (1980). Philosophy provides, after all, an ‘art of living’: identifying appropriate
actions and behaviours in order to live in the most beneficial way possible for the self and
society.
Stoicism will never and can never again exist as it once did in its Classical iteration; still,
it will persist in part, its doctrine divided up and shared. The vestiges of ancient Stoicism visible
at any point after the advent of Christianity constitute ‘weaker’ neo-stoicisms, forms which
emphasize various aspects of the doctrine. Extending the term ‘Stoic’ across centuries is possible
and plausible because this philosophy deals primarily with the self, and “the bare self is anyone’s
self, irrespective of gender, status, ethnicity, or chronology. Hence, […] the terms Stoic and
Epicurean are still available to us to describe someone’s self-orientation, while Platonic and
Aristotelian are not” (From Epicurus to Epictetus 27). Though critics may condemn the idea of a
universal self, humans have instinctual drives or inclinations that can be said to be universal and
it is these drives upon which the ancient philosophies – at least the Epicureans and Stoics – are
built. These philosophies contain elementary truths about human experience that are still
recognized today. When taking these essentials into consideration, the far-reaching influence of
Stoicism, adaptable to nearly any culture, is hardly surprising. For example, the Epicureans
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argued that pleasure is preferable to pain, and thus pursued pleasure. Equally viable, Stoics
propose predispositions to self-love, self-preservation, and sociability. Stoicism also heavily
emphasizes rationality as the fundamental characteristic of humanity, and what separates humans
from animals (Schofield 247).The Stoic ability to analyze and react to emotions of all ranks in a
calm and collected manner is perhaps their most well-known feature.
This ability to compartmentalize and rationally reflect on emotions and emotional stimuli
has long been both coveted and rejected. It is perhaps the case that any successful rehabilitation
of Stoic ethics “will have to defeat the idea that there is something deeply wrong, and perhaps
even psychologically impossible, about the kind of emotional life that Stoics recommend”
(Becker ‘Stoic Emotion’ 250). Yet, Stoic impassivity has not only been desirable, but these
therapeutic goals have been clearly outlined. The goal of Stoic indifference is not to feel nothing,
but to mediate and feel better, a function attributed by Cicero as the goal of all philosophy:
Assuredly there is an art of healing the soul – I mean philosophy, whose aid must be
sought not, as in bodily diseases, outside ourselves, and we must use our utmost
endeavour, with all our resources and strengths, to have the power to be ourselves our
own physicians (5).
The Stoic approach as therapeutic has been written on extensively. Two prominent texts
on the subject are Martha C. Nussbaum’s book The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in
Hellenistic Ethics (1994) and Richard Sorabji’s book Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic
Agitation to Christian Temptation (2002). Nussbaum’s work is particularly adamant about the
therapeutic value of Stoic doctrine. She claims that all Hellenistic philosophers, whether
Epicurean, Cynics, or Stoics, saw philosophy as a way to deal with life’s pressing issues and
trials in a productive way. More recently, Richard Sorabji addresses the development of ancient
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psychology and how it influenced early Christian thought. Generally, there is a heavily
emphasized presence of therapy in Stoic doctrine which makes it particularly engaging in times
of strife. Evelyn Hanley tells us that
[s]ince the time of its inception in the ancient world, Stoicism has represented an attitude
of mind that has tended to reappear in periods when profound changes in the social and
intellectual milieu have produced in men a feeling of disillusionment with the age and a
desire to seek compensation in a philosophy based upon an independence of externals
and a reliance on the life of the mind (1).
Stoicism’s therapeutic value ought to be emphasized in the context of Modernity.
Ancient Stoicism was a philosophy which emphasized rationality and self-regulation whereby
the investigation of passionate emotions could offer consolation, and often comprehension.
Control, emotional and otherwise, in the face of such drastic social, political, economic, and
personal changes as were occurring in the nineteenth century is advantageous to an individual
reeling from the trauma – or at the very least ‘malaise’ – of Modernity. Charles Taylor defines
the malaises of Modernity as “features of our contemporary society that people experience as a
loss or a decline, even as our civilization ‘develops.’ […] sometimes the loss is felt over a much
longer historical period: the whole modern era from the seventeenth century is frequently seen as
the time frame of decline” (Malaise of Modernity 1). Infamous for its indifferent attitude, the
ancient Stoic method immediately surfaces as a suitable reaction to loss. Thus in Modernity,
conditions seem ripe for a resurgence of Stoic ethics.
Friedrich Nietzsche would seem to agree. In The Gay Science (1882), he posited, “[f]or
those with whom fate attempts improvisation – those who live in violent ages and depend on
sudden and mercurial peoples – Stoicism may indeed be advisable” (306). Evelyn Hanley, author
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of Stoicism in Major English Poets of the Nineteenth Century (1964) echoes this sentiment by
outlining a neo-stoic influence in English writers like Alfred Lord Tennyson (1809-1892). She
says that as a practical response to a traumatic century, the revival of ancient Stoic aspects in the
nineteenth century is not surprising. She notes that,
Stoic reaction is observable in the nineteenth century as well, a period when the
intellectual atmosphere was permeated by an awareness of rapidly changing values in
almost every realm of thought, by the sense of a past slipping inevitably away, and the
fear of an unknown future. In a world so quickly developing a high complexity of
organization, when man’s intellectual nature was advancing more rapidly than his moral
nature, the greatest apparent need was for a sound ethics, a stabilizing spiritual influence
(Hanley 40).
Hanley identifies Stoic virtues among Matthew Arnold, Robert Browning, Alfred Lord
Tennyson and William Wordsworth. Not just among its poets, the influence of Stoicism was
strongly felt in England besides. Among those who propagated Stoic influence was Thomas
Carlyle. Carlyle was a renowned enemy of the dandies, a great proponent of self-discipline, and
is much more readily associated with Stoic features than the dandies who also claimed that
attribution. In Samuel Smiles’ Self-Help (1859) Smiles recounts the story of Caryle’s manuscript
for The French Revolution having been unknowingly burned by a housemaid. As the story goes,
upon hearing of the destruction of his manuscript, “his feelings may be imagined” (Smiles 102).
Having no other recourse, however, and no drafts, Carlyle re-wrote the entire copy from
memory. In the end, “that he persevered and finished the volume under such circumstances,
affords an instance of determination of purpose which has seldom been surpassed” (Smiles 102),
and is certainly emblematic of a purposefully unmoved Stoic countenance.
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Carlyle is tied to a larger movement with supposed Stoic links as well, coining the key
term ‘captains of industry’ in his work Past and Present (1843). Utilitarianism gained ground
throughout the nineteenth century in England. Broadly, Utilitarianism advocated maximizing
usefulness paired with self-interest; pursuing “the greatest happiness of the greatest number [as]
the measure of right and wrong” (Bentham 58). While this is usually interpreted in a hedonistic
sense, John Stuart Mill explicitly evokes and states a relation to ancient Stoicism in his
Utilitarianism:
in this condition the world, paradoxical as the assertion may be, the conscious ability to
do without happiness gives the best prospect of realising such happiness is attainable. For
nothing except that consciousness can raise a person above the chances of life, by making
him feel that, let fate and fortune do their worst, they have not power to subdue him:
which, once felt, frees him from excess of anxiety concerning the evils of life, and
enables him, like many a Stoic in the worst times of the Roman Empire, to cultivate in
tranquility the sources of satisfaction accessible to him, without concerning himself about
the uncertainty of their duration, any more than about their inevitable end (23).
One can hardly approach more closely Epictetus’ teachings in the Enchiridion than this
statement without directly quoting him. Fate and fortune cannot subdue the ancient Stoic because
those are exterior to the Stoic and therefore none of his concern (Epictetus 221). Similarly, it is
only the judgment of impressions that is harmful (223), and if an individual is cautious to remain
in accordance with nature in all of his actions, all will be well (223), and so on.
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2.3 The Ironic Response
Now that an impetus for neo-stoic ethics in the nineteenth century has been identified, the focus
must shift to its corresponding opposite. An equally strong opposing movement also emerges
from the instability of Modernity, but rather than trying to right the trauma by balancing it, the
focus shifts to embracing the newfound transience. This section is meant to describe the modus
operandi of the dandy, irony, and show how the dandy’s contemptuous nature is a consequence
of the same Modernity that bred a nineteenth century neo-stoicism. The dandies’ tendency to
ironize and parody their contemporaneous society will then be examined in relation to their selfascribed adaptation of ancient Stoicism, to argue that the dandy’s neo-stoicism is an ironic take
on the philosophy and on the dandy’s peers.
The instability of the modern situation did not uniformly inspire a search for stability.
Rather, the absurdity of trying to re-establish a system in which everything fits becomes more
and more evident as the proposed answers start fraying at the edges and can find no solid
foothold. When Charles Baudelaire proposed his definition of Modernity, he named it “le
transitoire, le fugitif, le contingent” (“Le Peintre” 553)38 and emphasized the obligation of art to
try to reflect this consciousness of the ephemeral in Modernity. The metropolis is the site of
transience par excellence in the nineteenth century, and one of the primary features of
Modernity. Many of the ‘traumas’ of Modernity are based specifically around the metropolitan
experience, so it is fitting that the practice Baudelaire endorsed, dandyism, is also located
primarily there. Other writers throughout the nineteenth century also alluded to the formative
impact (and almost always also inherent discomfort) that the city presented to them. Georg
Simmel’s essay “The Metropolis and Mental Life” (1903) is a particularly illuminating study of
the effects of the burgeoning city on the psyche. He describes how the modern individual has
38

“the transient, the fleeting, the contingent” (The Painter 17).
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been transformed by living in a large city – especially Paris, one of the so-called capitals of the
nineteenth century. Symptoms include a blasé attitude, superficiality, and alienation, among
others. These will be explored in greater depth in the next chapter.
The metropolis is the specific feature of Modernity that brings forth the dandy. The rise
of the dandy occurs concurrently with that of the city so that “dandyism might thus be considered
as a manner bred out of and in reaction to new conditions of urban society” (Godfrey 26). The
dandy is inextricably tied to the city and he could not exist outside of the metropolis. Few true
dandies lived outside of the cultural hubs of London and Paris, though there are some notable
exceptions like Gabriele d’Annunzio in Rome, Adolf Loos in Vienna, and Karl Gutzkow in
Berlin.
As a strictly urban phenomenon, the dandy is tied to the metropolis and owes many of his
characteristics to it. His urbane nature is a large part of what informs his irony. The OED defines
‘urbane’ as “elegant and refined in manners; courteous, civil; suave, sophisticated” (“urbane”).
As Sima Godfrey explains, the dandy
is characterized by a certain kind of fine wit and polish that we call urbane and which
dates back to Roman times when people from the Urbs (the city, Rome) were commonly
opposed to people from the country, rustici. […] With the rapid growth of the city in the
19th century, the etymological distinction of urbanus becomes meaningful again, and the
noun “urbanité” starts taking on new connotations that alert us to social change and to the
general impact of the Dandy’s style. The language of irony becomes identified with the
sophisticated and unnatural setting of the big city (26).
Gradually, the characterization of urbane takes on other connotations, including a certain
slickness, and comes to be associated if not with falsehood then certainly with duality. This can
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be seen in sub-definition 1C of the same entry from the OED, which says the urbane “follows the
pursuits, has the ideas or the sentiments, characteristic of town or city life” (“urbane”). These
then – quite literally “the ideas and sentiments characteristic of town and city life” – are applied
to the dandy, the man of the metropolis, and his speech; it is from the urbane that the dandy’s
doubled nature begins to appear. The experience of the metropolis in the nineteenth century, as
noted above according to sociologist Georg Simmel, is also chiefly concerned with an indifferent
attitude and estrangement. Thus, an urban figure is at once caught up within the pursuits, ideas,
and sentiments particular to their city life, but also experiences an estrangement or distance from
it. It is thus understandable that Godfrey calls the dandy “the signifying master of intertextual
polyphony, the man who consciously manipulates two levels of discourse at once” (31). Janusfaced, he engages with his environment on two levels: as a sophisticated and refined inhabitant,
but also as an indifferent and isolated spectator. These levels are “crucial to his creative
transformation. Duality and discord are mobilizing forces that enable the dandy to transform
himself into oeuvre d’art and immortalize himself through his work” (Humphreys 70).
I am not the first to find the dandy’s double-talk and manipulation of multiple registers
ironic. In fact, the dandy himself was conscious of this irony, and revels in it, calling it his
‘genius’: “L’ironie est un génie qui dispense de tous les autres. Elle jette sur un homme l’air de
sphinx qui préoccupe comme un mystère et qui inquiète comme un danger” (“Du Dandysme”
135)39. In what follows, I will address three important discussions on the dandy’s irony for
precedent. The first of these is from Walter Benjamin, nineteenth-century literary critic and
philosopher. He read Baudelaire extensively and carried out many studies of the poet, including
Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism and The Writer of Modern Life:

39

“The genius of irony suffices, for it gives man that sphinx-like air which interests as a mystery and troubles as a
danger” (Dandyism 55)
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Essays on Charles Baudelaire, and sections included in his mammoth Arcades Project, written
between 1927 and 1940. Benjamin was among the first literary critics to characterize the dandy
as ironic, notably because of his interpretation of their self-ascribed heroism.
As noted in the introduction and Chapter Two, the dandy considered himself a hero: “The
dandy, the aesthete, Baudelaire held, is a hero in modern society, a saint struggling against the
engulfing mediocrity of bourgeois culture” (Rhodes 391). To Baudelaire, dandies were “destined
to be heroes caught in an “unheroic” age” (Rossbach 83), elites adrift among an increasingly
intellectually impoverished culture. Though Baudelaire’s dandy is more well-known to have
found this parallel, Barbey’s dandy thought the same: throughout “Du Dandysme et de Georges
Brummell” he makes allusion to the dandy’s heroism.
Discussions of heroism were rampant throughout the nineteenth century. From Thomas
Carlyle’s hero typology in On Heroes and Hero Worship (1830) and his captains of industry, to
the Romantic heroes Byron and Chateaubriand and the heroics of Napoleon, there was a
considerable dialogue on the subject among the dandy’s contemporaries. The dandies, never ones
to miss out on a trend, propagate their own version of heroism as well. Incidentally, Barbey
expressed discontent at the dandy not being included in this list. In a footnote in his “Du
Dandysme et de Georges Brummell,” he says:
Thomas Carlyle, qui a écrit un autre livre intitulé les Héros et qui nous a donné le Héros
Poète, le Héros Roi, le Héros Homme de lettres, le Héros Prêtre, le Héros Prophète et
même le Héros Dieu, aurait pu nous donner le Héros de l’élégance oisive – le Héros
Dandy; mais il l’a oublié. Ce qu’il dit, du reste, dans le Sartor Resartus, des Dandys en
générale, qu’il appelle du gros mot de sect (Dandiacal Sect), montre assez qu’avec son
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regard embarbouillé d’Allemand, le Jean-Paul anglais n’eût rien vu de ces nuances
précises et froides qui furent Brummell. (110)40
Though he takes a mocking tone, perhaps Barbey has more than cause to be affronted by
the dandy’s notable absence from Carlyle’s text; after all, the links between heroism and the cult
of celebrity are palpable. Some have gone so far as to say that “celebrity is what ‘modern
civilization’ mistakenly reveres as heroism, but in so doing it manages to preserve the faculty by
which higher objects of worship could in future be recognized” (Salmon 65). In this sense,
dandyism is worthy of the title of heroism, if only to keep the notion of it alive. Both Barbey and
Baudelaire frequently refer to the dandy as hero, and Baudelaire first treats the subject of
heroism of in modern life in a short essay entitled “On Heroism” from his text Salon de 1846.
Benjamin identified the feint behind this heroism attributed to the impetuously idle
dandy. He saw that the dandy hero is the hero who can no longer go on journeys or fight epic
battles because great deeds on par with those of ancients are continually forestalled in a modern
context. Instead, “Modernity turns out to be [the hero’s] doom. There are no provisions for him
in it; it has not use for his type” (59). Without space for epic deeds, the hero is, for lack of a
better word, unemployed. He can only be an echo of a hero, because “the modern hero is no
hero; he is a portrayer of heroes. Heroic modernity turns out to be a Trauerspiel in which the
hero’s part is available” (60). Left to glorify himself in the quotidian, the dandy merely plays the
part of a hero whose exploits no longer concern the balance of good and evil, or right and wrong,
for those are no longer stable features. Benjamin’s text and the discussion of the dandy’s ironic
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“Thomas Carlyle, who has written another book called Heroes and given us the Hero Poet, the Hero King, the
Hero Man of Letters, the Hero Priest, the Hero Prophet and even the Hero God, might have given us the Hero of
elegant idleness – the Hero Dandy; but he has forgotten him. Besides, what he says, in Sartor Resartus of Dandies in
general, to whom he gives the vulgar name of the Dandiacal sect, shews sufficiently clearly that, with his confused
teutonic vision, the English Jean Paul would have observed none of those precise and frigid details which were
Brummell” (Dandyism 32)
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heroism is particularly relevant to this thesis as my argument traces a similar vein concerning the
dandy’s neo-stoicism. Just as the dandy picked up on the dialogue of heroism of the day and
transformed it for his own credo, he also picked up on the neo-stoic discussions of the day and
transformed them too.
Later interpretations of the dandy’s irony are more technical. In his article, “RuleFollowing in Dandyism: ‘Style’ as an Overcoming of ‘Rule’ and ‘Structure’” Thorsten BotzBorstein heavily emphasizes the fact that dandyism is nothing if not original, and in fact, “the
biggest fault one could commit is to believe that the dandy is a dandy because he follows the
rules of dandyism” (285) and that “the first rule of dandyism is to follow no rules at all” (285).
The dandy is an anarchist because he rejects “all rules and all norms” (285) and that “he is an
anarchist who does not claim anarchy. The reason for this is that the dandy does not claim
anything” (286). This interpretation of the dandy’s ironic perspective is essential for
understanding his parodic nature: “On the one hand he follows the rules perfectly (so perfectly
that his act of rule-following becomes a parody or a mockery). On the other hand, through his
style of following rules he makes clear his disdain for the rules of decadent aristocracy as well as
for the bourgeois world of money” (287).
The distinction that the dandy does not imitate, but rather mimes (290) is important
because it still allows room for active criticism and manipulation by the dandy. Botz-Borstein
also makes the important distinction that the dandy is not a snob. In fact, dandyism and snobbism
are diametrically opposed. Botz-Bornstein claims that the irony of snobbism consists of an irony
of inversion, whereas that of the dandy is much more complicated, and consists of an irony of
dispersion. Instead of merely parodying as expected by reversal or inversion, the dandy instead
“does not say ironically, ‘A+’ in order to imply simply ‘A-’ […] His ironically pronounced ‘A+’
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can mean ‘A+’, ‘A-’, ‘B’, ‘C’, or all four together or simply nothing at all” (293). This
interpretation, however, makes it difficult to maintain the initial reference point within this
polyphonic irony.
Sima Godfrey prefers the construction of irony laid down by Dan Sperber and Deirdre
Wilson. This “irony of mention” is not a traditional type of irony, simply involving a deliberate
reversal of facts or factors. Instead, Sperber and Wilson’s theory “invoke[s] the logical
opposition of use versus mention, and they conclude that all ironies may be interpreted as
mentions having the character of an echo” (Godfrey 29). The echo can be thought of as a
statement that may have made sense in one situation then becomes absurd in another, such as a
statement about nice weather in the middle of a thunderstorm. What differentiates the statement’s
status as either ‘absurd’ or ‘ironic’ is the interlocutor’s complicity (29) – if one is privy to the
dandy’s mindset, one can accept the statements he makes within the original frame of reference.
When the interlocutor is outside of the dandy’s perspective, whether politically, socially,
economically, philosophically, or all of these, he perceives the statement as absurd. This irony of
mention is employed by the dandies as a purposeful misuse or reinterpretation of common
phrases or ideas in order to deliberately undercut their present context. He purposefully uses the
mask of elegance to conceal just enough of his witticisms as to make them ambiguous, and just
enough to keep his interlocutors strongly divided between those who understand him and those
who don’t.
Godfrey says that it is the impertinence of deliberately misapplying context that links the
dandy to the ironic figure (29). She gives several excellent examples of phrases in which the
dandy demonstrates his ironic figuration. One of these quotes is the following anecdote about
Brummell:
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A friend one day called upon him, and found him confined to his room from a lameness
in one foot, upon which he expressed his concern at the accident. 'I am very sorry for it
too,' answered Brummell very gravely, 'particularly as its my favorite leg.' - Wm. Hazlitt,
"Brummelliana," London Weekly Review, Feb. 2, 1828. (Godfrey 21).
Godfrey explains the irony behind this statement as rooted in the dandy’s rebellious inversion of
the popular contemporaneous themes. Brummell’s statement about his favourite leg calls into
question larger discussions; in this case, utilitarianism. She explains that, in common parlance of
the time, practicality was a major concern. It was possible for a worker to bemoan an injury to
one of his better (that is, more useful) limbs, in the context of value. If the worker is right-handed
and needs that arm to swing a hammer, that arm is the better arm because it is of more use to the
worker. On the other hand, to have a favourite leg does not take use value into consideration but
rather aesthetic appreciation. To set himself apart from the common bourgeois of his time, the
dandy made sure to make it clear that he had “no other preoccupation in life than the culture of
the beautiful and his own aesthetic faculties” (Rhodes 391). Thus, with his statement, Brummell
is inverting a convention and mocking the general concern for utility that characterized the era of
industry (Godfrey 29). This is the dandy’s way of rebelling against the utilitarian fervour of his
contemporaries.
Godfrey’s notion of irony is particularly helpful for thinking through the dandy’s
approach to Stoicism because it shows that the dandy takes parts of his surrounding society (in
this case the utilitarian inclination) only to mock and invert – or as Godfrey says, “echo.” For
example, the dandy’s concentrated practice of leisure is similarly motivated: only “other men
may be cowed down and dragged into moral and intellectual slavery by material struggles and be
condemned to practise what are called the professions” (Rhodes 391, my emphasis). Again, this
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practice of leisure is in itself an effort to differentiate dandyism from the bourgeois society that
the dandy despised. That said, it was in fact this level of society that the dandy belonged to, since
none of the dandies were born into nobility, but built their reputations.
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Chapter Three: Dandiacal Appropriation: The Inversion and Diversion of Ancient Stoic
Principles by the Dandy

Le dandysme introduit le calme antique au sein des agitations modernes.
(“Du Dandysme” 119)41
The Stoics and the dandies both display indifferent facades. They both believe that emotions are
reactions that should be controlled, intellectualized, and contemplated at a distance. This section
will compare and contrast aspects of emotional comportment between the dandies and the
ancient Stoics in an attempt to discern how truly they match up and to show that, while it is true
the dandies employ similarly unemotional behaviour, there are substantial differences produced
by the dandy’s ironic adaptation. This section will compare how the ‘ingredients’ for an
indifferent attitude differ from the Stoics to the dandies. The first section will compare and
contrast the ancient Stoic’s view of impressions with that of the dandy. The second section will
address the processes of judgment and rationality from the ancient Stoic to the dandy. The third
section will address the status of “preferred indifferents” on each side. Finally, I will outline that
while following the ancient Stoic program would lead to a certain state of enlightenment known
as eudaimonia through practiced apatheia, in the dandy’s case a practiced apathy leads to an
ultimate state of ennui.
The following chapter will employ the sociological work of Georg Simmel, especially his
essay, “Metropolis and Mental Life” (1903) which deals with the psychological effects of
modern living on the individual. This choice might seem contestable on the grounds: that
Simmel was not French, but German; a sociologist, not a dandy; and writing after the turn of the
century, instead of during it. I propose that these three features make him the best suited as a
reference. I argue that being outside of the French milieu makes him a more objective observer.
41

“Dandyism introduces antique calm among our modern agitations” (Dandyism 42).
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That he was a sociologist who studied the effects of modern life on the individual psychology
also makes him well-equipped to handle this topic because the dandy’s ironic neo-stoicism is a
direct product of the effects of modern life on the individual. Finally, writing from the vantage
point of the turn of the century, Simmel was in an ideal position to be able to look back and
review what had happened in the past hundred years. His insightful comments on the
consequences of Modernity for the individual make him a useful resource regarding the
nineteenth century context but he is also useful for considering the dandies themselves. In
addition to attempting to situate the modern individual’s mindset within the metropolis in “The
Metropolis and Mental Life,” Simmel’s essay entitled “On Fashion” (1901) depicts fashion as a
natural product of a fast-paced environment like the metropolis. He argues that fashion is
composed of a paradoxical relationship of individualism and conformity, as groups come
together to form certain styles to differentiate themselves from another group. Thus, Simmel’s
research is doubly applicable to the dandy, having studied both the dandy’s primary environment
and his primary mode of expression.
The two dandy texts that I will examine in this chapter are Jules Barbey d’Aurevilly’s
“Du Dandysme et de Georges Brummell” and Charles Baudelaire’s “Le Peintre de la vie
moderne.” As noted in the introduction, these two texts represent the beginning of the
theorization of dandyism. These two texts offer several examples of appropriation and parody of
ancient Stoic doctrine under the guise of a nineteenth century neo-stoicism. The three main
ancient Stoic texts to be addressed in this chapter are Epictetus’ Enchiridion, Marcus Aurelius’
Meditations, and Seneca’s Letters from a Stoic. As suggested in Chapter One and Chapter Two,
these texts address a later account of ancient Stoicism primarily concerned with ethics (Sellars
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59). Further, it is these texts specifically that entered into the dialogue of neo-stoicism among the
dandy’s contemporaries, as his peers were looking into these texts (Hanley 1).
Ancient Stoic views teach somewhat extreme rationality and regulation of pathos or
‘passions.’ Often in surface readings, this conjures a caricature: a “picture-book Stoic wise man
[who] is devoid of passions, emotionless, and unfeeling” (Rist 259). Writing in the fourth and
fifth centuries, the Church Father Jerome characterized the Stoic goal of apatheia as a state of
becoming ‘either god or a stone.’ Margaret Graver, author of Stoicism and Emotion, comments
on this passage as half-true: “Being wise and thus free of the pathe does mean that one is godlike
[…] But it does not mean that one becomes like a stone, for there are genuine objects to which
the wise may respond affectively” (210). It is very important to note the distinction that ancient
Stoic doctrine does not advocate the elimination of emotional response, but rather a controlled
revaluation of initial responses to impressions. Championing intellect over instinct, one ought to
process all representations in a logical and rational way in order to remove the base, instinctive,
animal reactions. The ancient Stoic Sage, as the epitome of this rationality, is a model figure who
can critically adjudicate impressions and remain indifferent to ‘vulgar’ passions that arise from
them. Instead, the Sage uses these experiences constructively, knowing that he cannot rely on
any outer stimuli or objects to ensure his own happiness. The only claim to eudaimonia
[happiness] comes from within. According to Epictetus in the Enchiridion, the consummate
ancient Stoic is one who aims to be content no matter his circumstances: “untroubled with
disturbing thoughts about illness, danger, death, exile or loss of reputation” (127).
By contrast, the dandy’s ironic neo-stoicism is far less emotionally productive, and more
simply nominal and performative. Though the dandy likens himself to an ancient Stoic, the
dandy appropriates the ancient Stoic’s demeanour without necessarily internalizing the doctrine.
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Like Natta, I believe these changes are in part a consequence of historical differences, but unlike
Natta, I think the dandies still make productive use of ancient Stoic influence, albeit in a
substantially different direction than the original philosophy intended. Through their use of
irony, the dandies are indeed closer to the caricatured Stoic than to a faithful adherent of the
philosophy. Recalling that my definition of irony includes appropriation and parody with the end
of dissimulation or pretence, this chapter will examine how several key parts of ancient Stoic
indifference become inverted or diverted within the dandy’s neo-stoicism.
Like the ancient Stoic Sage’s imperturbability, the consummate dandy was known for his
sang-froid. The dandies also shunned passionate reactions and cultivated an impassive exterior.
Instinct is far below the dandy’s studied apathy: the dandy would never stoop to anger or
outbursts. That said, pithy, well-placed witticisms were not out of his range. While he loved
nothing more than to astonish others, nothing could astonish him – immoveable and proud, the
dandy was always reserved. However, the dandy’s adherence to a detached attitude is not as deep
as that of the ancient Stoics. In a phrase which belies the dandy’s more superficial subscription to
self-reserve Barbey says of Brummell, “son indolence ne lui permettait pas d’avoir de la verve,
parce que d’avoir de la verve, c’est se passionner; se passionner, c’est tenir à quelque chose, et
tenir à quelque chose, c’est se montrer inférieur ” (“Du Dandysme” 137).42 Imitating the ancient
Stoic by presenting “l’insensibilité” (“Le Peintre” 552)43, “ses yeux sagaces savaient se glacer
d’indifférence sans mépris, comme il convient à un Dandy consommé” (“Du Dandysme” 134),44
the dandy appropriates ancient Stoic influence by consistently giving the impression of following
their precepts, though in reality nodding to the fact that he is an “un Hercule sans emploi” (“Le
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“his indolence forbad his being lively, for to be lively is to be excited; to be excited is to care about something,
and to care about something is to shew oneself inferior” (Dandyism 56)
43
“cold detachment” (The Painter 12)
44
“a look of glacial indifference without contempt”(Dandyism 54)
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Peintre” 561)45. As a hero without a mission, or a Stoic without the harmonious worldview, the
dandy’s imitation becomes parody: it is placed on an incongruous, multiplicitous subject who
inhabits a modern, that is to say un-harmonious, metropolis.

3.1. Impressions
Ancient Stoic Impressions
The Stoics viewed emotions as judgments resulting from impressions. Impressions come from
outside of the individual, and are not produced by the individual. An impression is when “the
mind registers some state of affairs prior to forming an opinion about it in one way or another”
(Graver 24, my emphasis). They can concern any subject matter, and can have a ‘positive’ or
‘negative’ effect on the individual depending on how they are interpreted. Impressions are
immediate, and their content and occurrence are not controlled. Most importantly, impressions
have yet to be mediated by the individual. It is the reaction to these stimuli that is actually what
is most important in ancient Stoicism because, regardless of the content or context of the
impression, the individual can choose how they respond. Intuitive behaviours are rarely the most
appropriate to the ancient Stoic and likewise, the dandy strives to correct “la sauvagerie de
l’instinct’ (Raynaud 20).
In his teachings, the former slave Epictetus suggests that in order not to be carried away
by each impression, “make a practice at once of saying to every strong impression: ‘An
impression is all you are, not the source of the impression’” (221). This is meant to convey that
the impression or the occurrence which has presented itself to the individual, though it may stir
up a certain reaction, should be absolutely differentiated from that reaction. In order to properly
assess an impression, Epictetus recommends to “test and assess it with your criteria, but one
45

“an unemployed Hercules” (The Painter 40)
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primarily: ask, ‘Is this something that is, or is not, in my control?’ and if it’s not one of the things
that you control, be ready with the reaction, ‘Then it is none of my concern’” (221). Epictetus’
goal is detachment after careful consideration of the nature of the impression. The ancient Stoics
do not reject all emotion, but readily surrender themselves to the realization that impressions of
events that are beyond the control of the individual are not worth worrying over because they
cannot be changed.
Marcus Aurelius makes a similar observation about the importance of objective
observation in his Meditations. He advises to:
Always make a definition or sketch of what presents itself to your mind, so you can see it
stripped bare to its essential nature and identify it clearly, in whole and in all its parts, and
can tell yourself its proper name and the names of those elements of which it is
compounded and into which it will be dissolved (20).
Being able to keep each impression separate in the mind is integral to keeping composure. That
is why “[y]our impulse on every occasion should be to a complete survey of what exactly this
thing is which is making an impression on your mind – to open it out by analysis into cause,
material, reference, and the time-span within which it must cease to be” (Aurelius 118). It is
necessary to keep a clear sense of the impression as merely a representation that in itself is not
given to any specific response in an individual. It is in this way that the individual can keep a
measured emotional stance. Dissecting each impression leaves the ancient Stoic free to come to
terms with what the impression offers, and allows him to keep a clear head while he meditates
over his reaction.
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Modern and Dandy Impressions
In the modern context, impressions are still instances which invite discernment. However,
they have increased substantially in number. Georg Simmel says that one of the defining
characteristics of the modern metropolis is “the intensification of emotional life due to the swift
and continuous shift of external and internal stimuli” (“Metropolis” 325). With advancements in
technology and a drastic increase in population density, the amount of impressions and the speed
at which they occur to a dandy moving through Paris would have far exceeded those mediated by
a Stoic, even in the heart of the agora. Doubly, even triply stimulated, the dandy would have to
work harder to interpret responses to “the rapid telescoping of changing images, pronounced
differences within what is grasped at a single glance, and the unexpectedness of violent stimuli”
(“Metropolis” 325). Baudelaire identifies this, especially as regards the artist and the actor, and
he speaks of a spiralling and amplifying delirium that accompanies any attempt to capture the
world, whether in part or in whole. The artist
se trouve alors comme assailli par une émeute de details, qui tous demandent justice avec
la furie d’une foule amoureuse d’égalité absolue. Toute justice se trouve forcément
violée; toute harmonie détruite, sacrifiée; mainte trivialité devient énorme; mainte
petitesse, usurpatrice. Plus l’artiste se penche avec impartialité vers le détail, plus
l’anarchie augmente. Qu’il soit myope ou presbyte, toute hiérarchie et toute
subordination disparaissent (“Le Peintre” 555).46

46

“finds himself assailed, as it were, by a riot of details, all of them demanding justice, with the fury of a mob in
love with absolute equality. Any form of justice is inevitably infringed; any harmony is destroyed, sacrificed; a
multitude of trivialities are magnified; a multitude of little things become the usurpers of attention. The more the
artist pays impartial attention to detail, the greater does the anarchy becomes. Whether he be long- or short-sighted,
all sense of hierarchy and subordination disappears” (The Painter 22).
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This fundamentally changes the dandy’s relation to ancient Stoicism. As Natta rightly
interpreted, there are fundamental changes between the worldview of an ancient Stoic and that of
the modern dandy, predicated upon the fact that in Modernity the possibility of an ordered
universe seems unfathomable and unattainable. Whether due to political upheavals, social
redefinition, or even technological and scientific advancement, the world is no longer ordered as
it once was. Or rather, new principles of order have to be developed in this vertiginous
atmosphere. Charles Taylor argues that previously, people had been able “to see themselves as
part of a larger order. […] This hierarchical order in the universe was reflected in the hierarchies
of human society. People were often locked into a given place, a role and station that was
properly theirs and from which it was almost unthinkable to deviate” (Malaise of Modernity 3).
For the Stoics, “the universe formed a rational and divinely ordered whole. The ultimate goal in
life was virtue, and behaving virtuously entailed an individual extirpating his or her passions and
following the dictates of reason” (Dew 486). But because the vertigo of Modernity is based on
the obliteration of these hierarchies, the sense of implicit external harmony and unity that is such
a necessary premise of ancient Stoicism will not be able to function in the context of Modernity.
For the dandies, the same conditions that elicited a neo-stoic response also made it impossible for
a genuine form of ancient Stoicism to exist within Modernity. Whereas the Stoic’s impulse is to
remain in accordance with the ordered causal universe, there is no way to be in full accordance
with the dandy’s post-Copernican and post-Enlightenment universe. The dandies inhabited a
space that is beyond the perceived cosmological harmony of the ancient Stoics. Where I differ
from Natta is that I believe that the lack of coherence in Modernity does not preemptively negate
any use or validity of ancient Stoic doctrine in the dandy’s neo-stoicism, but rather simply
requires a turn in a new direction: irony.
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The condition of the man of Modernity is one of over-stimulation. The result of this is
that the dandy’s diversion from ancient Stoic meditative indifference can be read as a
consequence of the hyper-vigilance that Modernity’s plethora of impressions imposes. In the
face of over-stimulation, the dandy appropriates the ancient Stoic’s standard attitude to attempt
to deal with this. Barbey clearly elicits this when he notes that dandyism endows “le calme
antique au sein des agitations modernes” (“Du Dandysme” 119).47 Despite its nominal and
performative presence, the dandies are chronically impeded from fully employing the Stoic
practice and from effectively reasoning through their impressions by the continual bombardment
of inherently discordant impressions. The lack of recourse to a higher notion of unity such as the
ancient Stoics possessed means that despite even with the most earnest attempts of mediation or
the most concentrated indifferent attitude, the dandy will only ever be able to perform a likeness
of ancient Stoicism. The dandies might appropriate the semblance of “le calme antique” (“Du
Dandysme” 119) through enacting an indifferent attitude, but end up parodying it because “des
agitations modernes” (“Du Dandysme” 119) displace the good intentions in sheer wealth of
numbers and lack of connection between them.
Baudelaire says that going out onto the Paris streets is akin to moving through “une
immense reservoir d’éléctricité” (“Le Peintre” 552).48 In the face of this, the dandy’s stance is
best explained with an example of what the dandy is not. This example is Constantin Guys, the
painter of modern life, the subject of Baudelaire’s essay. Guys is contrasted with the dandy in the
following ways. For a passionate painter like Constantin Guys, “c’est une immense jouissance
que d’élire domicile dans le nombre, dans l’ondoyant, dans le mouvement, dans le fugitif et

47
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“antique calmness among our modern agitations” (Dandyism 42)
“an enormous reservoir of electricity” (The Painter 13).
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l’infini” (“Le Peintre” 552)49 and go out into the crowd with the intent to soak up what Barbey
calls “cette autre vie […] qui bat plus fort, qui tinte et éblouit” (“Du Dandysme” 131)50. Guys, a
lover of life, is like “un moi insatiable pour du non-moi, qui, à chaque instant, le rend et
l’exprime en images plus vivantes que la vie elle-même, toujours instable et fugitive (“Le
Peintre” 552).51 However, the dandy is the opposite of Guys’ “amabam amare […] J’aime
passionnément la passion” (“Le Peintre” 552).52
In a glittering description of how Constantin Guys views and portrays the world,
Baudelaire calls the daily scene “si majestueux et si brilliant” (“Le Peintre” 552)53, mentioning a
barrage of images of horses, grooms, pageboys, women, fashion trends, a regiment marching by,
workers, and more. Despite displaying some of the same facets as the dandy, like “une
quintessence de caractère et une intelligence subtile de tout le mécanisme moral de ce monde”
(“Le Peintre” 552),54 Guys “est dominé, lui, par une passion insatiable, celle de voir et de sentir”
(“Le Peintre” 552).55 It is exactly the exuberance of life that Guys so admires that the dandies are
trying to evade. Whereas Guys feeds off of the energy of the busy street and enjoys losing
himself in the myriad of details in front of him, the dandy has the opposite reaction and aspires to
“insensibilité” (“Le Peintre” 552)56 to preserve his sanity in the face of it.

49

“it becomes an immense source of enjoyment to establish his dwelling in the throng, in the ebb and flow, the
bustle, the fleeting and the infinite” (The Painter 12).
50
“that other life, louder, noisier, and more confusing” (Dandyism 52).
51
“an ego athirst for the non-ego, and reflecting [life] at every moment in energies more vivid than life itself, always
inconstant and fleeting” (The Painter 13)
52
“I love passion, passionately” (The Painter 12).
53
“majestic and dazzling” (The Painter 14).
54
“a quintessence of character and a subtle understanding of all the moral mechanisms of this world” (The Painter
12)
55
“is dominated, if ever anyone was, by an insatiable passion, that of seeing and feeling” (The Painter 12)
56
“cold detachment” (The Painter 12)
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It seems that such exuberance can only lead to parody on both ends of the spectrum. Such
an “homme-enfant” (“Le Peintre” 552)57 as Guys is over-sensitive to the world, but the
indifferent dandy is under-sensitive to it. The afflicted individual either embraces the swift
current of the metropolis like Guys, or builds a stony wall between themselves and the exterior
like the dandies to blunt the spectrum of reaction to the impressions that they are confronted
with. As Barbey intones, the dandy is like “une pierre qui attire la mousse, sans se laisser
pénétrer par la fraîcheur qui la couvre” (“Du Dandysme” 140).58 This vision of the dandy is
much more in line with Saint Jerome’s idea of the Stoics necessarily being either God or a stone
(Graver 210). In order not to be carried away with the crowd, the dandy must separate himself
from the impressions in front of him inspired by his ancient Stoic forefathers, but like Jerome, he
goes too far in his assumptions and ends up merely coldly indifferent.
In applying the ancient Stoic recourse of indifference, the dandy becomes that caricatured
story-book Stoic, only able to defer reaction, not to deal with it. Even if the dandy had time
between the impressions to distinguish between them, he does not have access to a harmonious,
interconnectivity in which to order them, and so must suspend his emotional reaction. The first
part of what metamorphoses the dandy’s neo-stoicism is the fact that they are bombarded with
many more impressions than the ancient Stoic was. This fact affects how the dandy employs
judgment and reason to impressions, as will be shown in the next section.

57
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“man-child” (The Painter 12)
“the stone that draws to itself the moss and is unpenetrated by the coolness of its covering” (Dandyism 58).
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3.2 Judgment and Rationality
Ancient Stoic Judgment and Rationality
Because circumstances can be so unpredictable, ancient Stoicism focuses on what can be
controlled about a situation. Impressions are, as noted, an opportunity for discernment: upon
experiencing an impression, it is up to the individual to decide if what the impression presents is
valid, true, or objective, and whether it should prompt a positive or negative reaction. This
opportunity for judgment is called ‘assent’ in the Stoic doctrine. Assent is more than affirming or
denying the impression’s validity. Assent involves interpretation by the individual before the
rationalized emotional choice proceeds (From Epicurus to Epictetus 384). Therefore, instinctual
reactions figure as ‘pre-emotions’ and occur prior to the conscious action of assent. To the
Stoics, to accept those pre-emotions and take them as truth would be contrary to human
rationality. All animals are capable of instinctual reactions, but it is only humans who can, thanks
to rationality, process and mediate their feelings in different circumstances.
This assent also requires appropriately interpreting a response. For the ancient Stoics an
overly passionate response would be the result of an erroneous evaluation. For even the passions
fall within the boundaries of the rational mind: as Anthony A. Long explains, emotions “are
activities of a uniformly rational mind because only a rational mind could be subject to human
emotions. Indeed, only a rational mind can act irrationally, meaning commit errors of judgment”
(From Epicurus to Epictetus 379-380). If the individual is capable of making a bad judgment,
then he is capable of making a good one, as well. Bad judgments – passions or disturbances – are
“‘sicknesses’ that need to be ‘cured’ by analysis of their nature and origin and by advice” (Gill
41), using judgment and rationality.
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The reasoning principle is essential to the ancient Stoic. Although an event – tragic or
otherwise – may occur, humans are rational beings and “reason supervenes as craftsman of
impulse” (Diogenes Laertius, VII 86, quoted in Schofield), thus enabling man to deal with his
reactions in a productive way. According to Seneca in the Letters from a Stoic, the advantage
that man has is that he is a “rational animal” (88). Marcus Aurelius is quite clear on reason’s
importance: “Revere your power of judgment. All rests on this to make sure that your directing
mind no longer entertains any judgment which fails to agree with the nature or the constitution of
a rational being. And this state guarantees deliberate thought” (20). In this way, the philosopher
will come to understand that “[f]or a rational nature the right path is to withhold assent to
anything false or obscure in the permissions made on its mind […] to reserve its desires and
aversions to what lies in our power” (72). Epictetus says that cultivating the appropriate response
to impressions will eventually become second nature if one is stringent:
For every challenge, remember the resources you have within you to cope with it.
Provoked by the sight of a handsome man or a beautiful woman, you will discover within
you the contrary power of self-restraint. Faced with pain, you will discover the power of
endurance. If you are insulted, you will discover patience. In time, you will grow to be
confident that there is not a single impression that you will not have the moral means to
tolerate (225).
Epictetus is supremely confident in man’s reasoning abilities to assure balance within
himself. Here he is describing the slow climb to apatheia, reached by continually making
appropriate decisions and classifications of impressions. He argues that this should become
simpler as the individual becomes accustomed to the sorting. The emphasis here is never to
equate impressions – whether beautiful, painful, or tempting, as he describes – to one level, but
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as he says, to learn to tolerate them. ‘Toleration’ implies here seeing the object as it really is and
being able to reconcile oneself to the object’s true state or status impartially. To really illustrate
the extent to which rationality should be cultivated, Epictetus’ illustrations explicitly go beyond
somewhat trivial instances like seeing a desirable person in the street into more challenging
territory. He demonstrates as follows:
In the case of particular things that delight you, or benefit you, or to which you have
grown attached, remind yourself of what they are. Start with things of little value. If it is
china you like, for instance, say, ‘I am fond of a piece of china.’ When it breaks, then you
won’t be as disconcerted. When giving your wife or child a kiss, repeat to yourself, ‘I am
kissing a mortal.’ Then you won’t be so distraught if they are taken from you (222).
Epictetus’ extreme rationalism – while it may seem cold and unfeeling – in actuality has the goal
of consolation. What Epictetus is recommending is not that all experiences are the same, or that
breaking a jug is the same as losing one’s wife. The goal of his rule is not to debase the wife or
patronize her, but to comfort the one who loses his wife. Remembering that a wife is a human
and humans are mortal is meant to reinforce that the loss was, although unfortunate, inevitable
and part of a grander scheme beyond the individual’s control. It is meant to highlight to the
individual that most things in life are transient.
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Judgment and Rationality for the Modern Dandy
The situation is somewhat different in the nineteenth century. Rationality is paramount to the
modern metropolitan man, not least because he is confronted by a prodigious amount of
impressions in the metropolis. Simmel notes that “the metropolitan type – which naturally takes
on a thousand individual modifications – creates a protective organ for itself against the profound
disruption with which the fluctuations and discontinuities of the external milieu threaten it”
(“Metropolis” 326). This ‘organ’ is Reason (326).
According to Simmel, the metropolis naturally produces reasoning individuals in order to
protect against the barrage of impressions they receive. In order to stay afloat in the midst of
every movement or image that might uproot them, “instead of reacting emotionally, the
metropolitan type reacts primarily in a rational manner” (“Metropolis” 326). Barbey uses almost
the same phrasing in his own text, speaking of the dandy “chez qui la tête est au-dessous du
coeur” (“Du Dandysme” 157).59 This separation supposedly enables man to deal with his
reactions in a productive way: “the intellectualistic quality […] is thus recognized as a protection
of the inner life against the domination of the metropolis” (“Metropolis 326) and “the modern
mind has become a more and more calculating one” (“Metropolis 327) as a result. Studied
indifference and objectivity is the dandies’ primary line of defense. Baudelaire is also aware of
the emphasis on the reasoning individual. In Le peintre de la vie moderne, he notes the difference
between reasoning and non-reasoning individuals to be distinct as the abilities of a man and a
child:
L’homme de génie a les nerfs solides; l’enfant les a faibles. Chez l’un, la raison a pris une
place considérable; chez l’autre, la sensibilité occupe presque tout l’être. Mais le génie
n’est que l’enfance retrouvée à volonté, l’enfance douée maintenant, pour s’exprimer,
59

“whose head dominates his heart” (Dandyism 71)
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d’organes virils et de l’esprit analytique qui lui permet d’ordonner la somme de
matériaux involontairement amassée (“Le Peintre” 552)60
The man of Modernity’s world-weary attitude, the initial connection between Stoicism and
dandyism, actually has less to do with the unifying reasoning of the Stoics and more to do with a
certain jadedness which comes with the over-stimulation mentioned. Instead of allaying passions
objectively, the dandy has reached a point where he is replete with experience. He suffers from
an over-loaded consciousness which he then actively tries to limit or unload by abiding by
precepts which would seem to alleviate his burden: an undifferentiated shunning of passions as
opposed to a deliberate rational choice in each instance.

3.3 Preferred Indifferents
Stoic Preferred Indifferents
For ancient Stoics, when an impression occurs there can be an initial gut reaction, also known as
a pre-emotion or propatheiai (From Epicurus to Epictetus 380). Pre-emotions are initial
responses, like a burst of anger, which are distinct from full judgments. Pre-emotions are
instinctual responses which are immediate and unmediated in response to an impression. On the
other hand, pathos or passions – also ‘mental disturbances’ (Sandbach 59) – are a subsection of
emotions which have not been properly thought through. Pathos are not the initial response, but
rather the consequence of an error in judgment. Errors in judgment are over-reactions
“motivating us to treat non-essential advantages or disadvantages as if they are basic to our wellbeing” (From Epicurus to Epictetus 381). Putting too much emphasis on the health or wealth, for
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“The man of genius has strong nerves; those of the child are weak. In the one, reason has assumed an important
role; in the other, sensibility occupies almost the whole being. But genius is no more than childhood recaptured at
will, childhood equipped now with man’s physical means to express itself, and with the analytical mind that enables
it to bring order into the sum of experience, involuntarily amassed” (The Painter 11).
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example, can cause us to react in a way that is not in line with virtue. Advantages like health and
wealth, while potentially preferable, are not in themselves moral or virtuous, nor are they
constant. They are, rather, matters requiring choice to view them either of those ways (Schofield
240-241). Good health might be beneficial to an individual in most cases, but it cannot be
guaranteed nor can a healthy person be guaranteed happiness in spite of health. Circumstances
vary, and fortunes change: the only thing which can be controlled is the reaction to one’s
position.
The Stoics maintain what are called ‘preferred indifferents.’ Only certain emotions,
actions, or objects are considered truly virtuous and worthy of pursuit. Virtue is the use of the
qualities mentioned above, like moderation and endurance, to ensure one’s own happiness.
Virtue is “conceived as the capacity to use such advantages wisely, being the only candidate for
that which is always beneficial” (Seddon 10). Health and wealth do not fit into the virtue
category. Though not virtuous, they are not exactly bad either, and are referred to as
‘advantages.’ Advantages include owning property, being rich, having good health, and so on.
These are not conditions for virtue, because “a man’s excellence or virtue – the Greek word arête
covers both – does not depend on his success in obtaining anything in the external world, it
depends entirely on his having the right mental attitude towards those things” (Sandbach 29).
Thus Stoicism is not a philosophy of poverty or property renunciation, but rather it proposes that
these advantages are secondary to virtue.
One should be wary of advantages though, lest they become a focus. Pursuing advantages
believing that they are virtuous is what leads to errors in judgment (passions) “because they do
not benefit those who possess them in all circumstances” (Seddon 10). Wealth does not protect
one from falling ill, for example, though it may aid in procuring doctors or cures. Happy
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circumstances such as these are not necessary but not discouraged. Though we possess
rationality, “our notion of human nature cannot be confined to reflection on the impulse to
concern ourselves with health, possessions, and the like: to what we might call merely human”
(Schofield 245). It is important that apatheia can and should be achieved without advantages
because “they are not values that contribute to his excellence and his happiness, of which [the
individual] is the sole arbiter” (Sandbach 29). That said, as with the pre-emotions, neither should
advantages be disregarded because it is through analysis of them that incorrect behaviours can be
identified.
Anthony A. Long says that Epictetus, instead of approaching ‘preferred indifferents’
directly, approaches them by relying on “the distinction between what is ‘ours’ and ‘what is not
ours’” (Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life 185), which is the very first distinction set
down in the Enchiridion: “We are responsible for some things, while there are others for which
we cannot be held responsible” (221). According to Long, “[t]he moral point of view is ‘ours’
and completely ‘up to us’; material well-being, whether of our body or of anything else, is ‘not
ours’ and ‘not up to us.’ Hence, if happiness is to be completely up to us, it must be grounded in
the former and not in the latter” (Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life 185). So while
Epictetus is not explicit about his preferred indifferents, it is possible to extrapolate that what
exists outside of the self and of the control of the individual, like health or wealth, are gratuitous
and should not be depended on.
In Letter CIV, Seneca is more explicit about the details of preferred indifferents, using
the case of travel for an example. He is quite clear about his opinion: while such luxuries as
travel may show you other countries, exotic locales, new insight into other cultures, and more,
“travel won’t make a better or a saner man of you. For this we must spend time in study and in
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the writings of wise men, and learn the truths that have emerged from their researches, and carry
on in the search ourselves” (189). To believe that any exterior advantages have the power to
bring happiness is to have a soul that still “needs to be rescued from its miserable state of
slavery” (189). Preferred indifferents are merely perks, and should not be relied on or hoped for,
because they are beyond the individual’s control.

Modern and Dandy Preferred Indifferents
There are some parallels of preferred indifferents within dandyism, particularly concerning
wealth. Most dandies – Brummell included – were actually not from nobility but rather the rising
middle class from which they sought to distance themselves. Dandies “may have mixed with
aristocrats, but they advocated a social elite which was based on abilities, genius or style, rather
than birth” (Hammill 67). The dandies tried to build a new kind of aristocracy separate from their
bourgeois backgrounds. The dandies’ reluctance to deal with pecuniary culture is primarily to
separate themselves from the bourgeois classes and create a social distinction between those
classes and themselves. That said, while dandies would prefer not to have to deal with money,
they also recognize wealth’s potentially beneficial role in political, social, and intellectual
freedom.
The dandy separated wealth from his list of ‘necessities’, but Baudelaire confirms the
‘preferred’ status of wealth in the following passage from The Painter of Modern Life: “le dandy
n’aspire pas à l’argent comme à une chose essentielle; un crédit infini pourrait lui suffire” (“Le
Peintre” 560)61. To be a dandy does not require money, though. He is to be elegant in all
situations, whether penniless or flush. It is not uncommon for the dandy to finish as a bohemian

61

the dandy does not aspire to wealth as an object in itself; an open bank credit would suit him just as well” (The
Painter 37).
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with little or no money, having squandered it while he had it. The dandy – like Baudelaire
himself – would make use of any income or inheritance while he had it, often using it up
frivolously and very quickly. Similarly, Brummell remained as much a dandy as ever in his later
years, Barbey tells his readers, though he was insolvent and removed from his previous social
circle by his flight to France, Brummell remained as much a dandy as ever: “il le fut aussi avant
qu’homme puisse l’être dans la pauvreté et dans la faim” (“Du Dandysme” 161).62 The dandy
would prefer an unlimited bankroll or inheritance, but perhaps also enjoyed the notoriety of
finishing up his life as a bohemian. Health and wealth would suit them well, but true dandies are
always elegant regardless of these factors.
Having appropriated the idea of preferred indifferents and nominally employed it by
citing advantages, especially wealth, as non-essential, the dandy then proceeds to review why
these advantages are not mere perks but legitimate desires that will cause genuine benefit. For
example, after Baudelaire says that to be a dandy “n’aspire pas à l’argent comme à une chose
essentielle,” (“Le Peintre” 560)63 he immediately flips this by saying that “un crédit infini
pourrait lui suffire” (“Le Peintre” 560).64 So the dandy does not require physical piles of money,
but does want the benefits of having a full bank account. A penniless dandy would remain a
dandy and elegant to the best of his abilities, but the fact remains that some form of wealth or
credit makes it substantially easier to remain elegant. Speaking specifically of love as a pastime
for those with money, Baudelaire says that “il est malheureusement bien vrai que, sans le loisir et
l’argent, l’amour ne peut être qu’une orgie de roturier ou l’accomplissement d’un devoir
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“remained a Dandy as long as it was possible amid poverty and hunger” (Dandyism 73).
“does not aspire to wealth as an object in itself” (The Painter37)
64
“an open bank credit would suit him just as well” (The Painter 37)
63
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conjugal” (“Le Peintre” 559).65 Leisure and money, while nominally dismissed, turn out to be
absolutely necessary to certain behaviours. Similarly, always tongue in cheek, Barbey bewails
the low stature of the term ‘Frivolity,’ which he defines as the “nom haineux donné à tout un
ordre de préoccupations très légitimes au fond, puisqu’elles correspondent à des besoins réels”
(“Du Dandysme” 120).66 Here Barbey parodies the ancient hierarchy of preferred indifferents
marking ‘frivolity’ with his very real wants.
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“it is unfortunately very true that, without leisure and money, love can be no more than an orgy of the common
man, or the accomplishment of a conjugal duty” (The Painter 36)
66
“the hateful name bestowed upon a whole class of preoccupations which are really very legitimate, since they
correspond to real wants” (Dandyism 43).
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3.4. The Results: Apatheia and Apathy
Un dandy peut être un homme blasé, peut être un homme souffrant; mais, dans ce dernier cas, il
sourira comme le Lacédémonien sous la morsure du renard.
-“Le Peintre” 56067
Ancient Stoic Apatheia
The ancient Stoic sought apatheia, or the state of impassivity, to help him on the way to
eudaimonia (happiness). Apatheia is much different from the modern meaning of apathy – a state
which, though inspired by apatheia, signifies not just emotional indifference, but also a lack of
interest in general. Apatheia does not mean that the individual has become insensitive to pleasure
and pain, but rather that they have become sensitive to them “in the way that [they] ought to be”
(Rist 260). Seneca describes the difficulty of definition in a letter as follows:
We are bound to involve ourselves in ambiguity if we try to express in a single word the
meaning of the Greek term apatheia by transferring it straight into our word impatienta.
For it may be understood in the opposite sense to the one we wish, with people taking it
to signify the man who is unable to endure anything that goes badly for him instead of
what we mean by it, the man who refuses to allow anything that goes badly for him to
affect him. Consider then whether it might not be preferable to call it a mind that is
‘invulnerable’ or ‘above suffering’ (47).
To become ‘above suffering’ means becoming knowledgeable about what emotions are ‘true’ or
‘valid.’ This means striving for eupatheiai, good or ‘stable’ emotions, which include wishing,
caution, and joy (From Epicurus to Epictetus 380). Good judgments and virtuous behaviours like
moderation lead to the ultimate goal of the Sage: eudaimonia, meaning ‘happiness,’ or
67

“A dandy may be blasé, he may even suffer pain, but in the latter case he will keep smiling, like the Spartan under
the bite of the fox” (The Painter 37)

82

‘flourishing’ (Seddon 3). This state is completely dependent on “a man’s own doing, the
operation of his mind: if he judges correctly and holds steadfastly to truth he will be a perfect
being, whom misfortune may strike but never harm” (Sandbach 68). So, apatheia is the name of
the state of being without passions, or rather, knowing how to react to them appropriately and
indifferently. Beyond this, eudaimonia is the state which is possible after perfecting one’s
apatheia. Eudaimonia is more than just happiness; it is a state of irreproachability attained
through rational comportment. Fortunes may change, but the Sage recognizes that his happiness
is completely dependent on himself. In ancient Stoicism, to sustain apatheia is an essential step
on the way to happiness.

Modern and Dandy Apathy
Stoic indifference and dandy indifference do not map onto each other regularly or completely.
The excess of impressions combined with the inability to adequately reason between them make
it no surprise that the dandy chooses apathy. The ancient Stoics use their apatheia to attain a
higher understanding; the dandies appropriate and parody this indifference and end by making it
apathy.
The dandy’s devil-may-care demeanour is essentially a mask. Barbey readily admits to its
presence: “ces stoïciens de boudoir boivent dans leur masque leur sang qui coule, et restent
masqués” (“Du Dandysme” 148),68 and more clearly still, Barbey notes Brummell’s “élégante
froideur qu’il portrait comme une armure et qui le rendait invulnérable” (“Du Dandysme” 148)69
Similarly, Baudelaire says: Un dandy peut être un homme blasé, peut être un homme souffrant;
mais, dans ce dernier cas, il sourira comme le Lacédémonien sous la morsure du renard (“Le
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“These Stoics of the boudoir drink their own blood under their mask and remain masked” (Dandyism 64)
“air of elegant indifference which he wore like armour, and which made him invulnerable” (Dandyism 64).
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Peintre” 560).70 Regardless of what is going on underneath the surface, the dandy will keep a
straight face – or rather, keep his mask on straight.
The mask is a clear indication of parody. The appropriation of the ancient Stoic
countenance takes up residence on the outer side of the mask, but beneath that, the dandy is
using his calm exterior to defer emotional response in a thoroughly un-Stoic way. The shield-like
use of the mask shows how the dandies deflect impressions whereas the Stoics reflect on them
thoroughly. Modernity’s assault on the senses inspires the blasé attitude which is the dandy’s
chosen recourse to the assault. Semantically speaking, this is shown in the lexical field of
conflict employed by the dandies. Relevant words that recur include protection, shield, hostile,
cloak and power. Barbey clearly noted the protective properties of indifference and its variants,
including impertinence. He comments on its defensive qualities, saying that it
n’a pas besoin du secours des mots pour apparaître; sans appuyer, elle a une force bien
autrement pénétrante que l’epigramme la plus brillamment rédigée. Quand elle existe,
elle est le plus grand porte-respect qu’on puisse avoir contre la vanité des autures, si
souvent hostile, comme elle est aussi la plus élégant manteau qui puisse cacher les
infirmités qu’on sent en soi. A ceux qui l’ont, qu’est-il besoin d’autre chose?” (“Du
Dandysme” 137)71
The dandy shields his issues with a cool exterior. Here again, I must give credit to MarieChristine Natta: she said that it is the “vulnérabilité du dandy [qui] explique son comportement
stoïcien. Il lui faut impérativement présenter aux autres une surface lisse, effacer toute aspérité
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“A dandy may be blasé, he may even suffer pain, but in the latter case he will keep smiling, like the Spartan under
the bite of the fox” (The Painter 37)
71
“impertinence is a veiled genius and does not need the help of words to appear; without any accentuation, its
power is far greater than that of the most brilliant epigram; it is the best shield against the vanity of others, so often
hostile, and the best cloak to cover one’s own weaknesses. What need of other protection is there for those who
possess it?” (Dandyism 56)

84

sensible. Il contient et cache sa douleur” (Natta 133). Baudelaire’s dandy is the man of
Modernity, the man who must come face to face with all that the modern world is and all that it
cannot be. Other critics have noticed the undertones of emotion beneath dandyism’s cold
exterior, like Jessica Feldman, who posited that “[b]ecause Baudelaire has conceived of a dandy
who creates himself in response to feelings of displacement and pain, the dandy’s usual
nonchalance and impertinence are over-shadowed by his regret, intensity, and self-absorption”
(120). Barbey noted something similar with Brummell: “sous le vernis de cette vanité toujours en
grande tenue, il cacha probablement bien des douleurs” (“Du Dandysme” 155).72 Concealing
unhappiness is most definitely not the goal of the ancient Stoic approach: the dandy uses the
Stoic treatment not to alleviate his pains but to mask them.
The dandy’s stoic face is but a veneer, and this typifies the dandy’s ironic performance of
neo-stoicism. This charade becomes clear when Baudelaire, who seems to be advocating for a
Stoic countenance, contradicts this claim by saying that the modern man is in a constant state of
mourning for the world. More than ten years before Le Peintre de la vie moderne, in Le Salon de
1846, Baudelaire wrote about the modern uniform of the black suit, describing it as the only
attire suitable for such an age:
Quant à l’habit, la pelure du héros moderne […] cependent, n’a-t-il pas sa beauté et son
charme indigène […] n’est-il pas l’habit nécessaire de notre époque, souffrante et portant
jusque sur ses épaules noires et maigres le symbole d’un deuil perpétuel? Remarquez
bien que l’habit noir et la redingote ont non-seulement leur beauté politique, qui est
l’expression de l’égalité universelle, mais encore leur beauté poétique, qui est
l’expression de l’âme publique; - une immense défilade de croque-morts, croque-morts
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“Beneath the varnish of [Brummell’s] vanity, always in full dress, he probably concealed much unhappiness”
(Dandyism 69)
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politiques, croque-morts amoureux, croque-morts bourgeois. Nous célébrons tous
quelque enterrement. (“Le Salon” 259-260)73
To be in a constant state of mourning is definitely at odds with the Stoics’ sense of carefully
chosen emotional judgments. The neo-stoicism proposed by the dandy was not very productive
emotionally, unlike the goal of the ancient Stoics’ treatment of emotion. The irony behind the
dandy’s neo-stoicism is that, while he may have walked like a Stoic and talked like a Stoic, in the
end the infamous refusal to feel emotion did not do him any good. In fact, the dandy’s suffering
was magnified behind the mask he donned and worked so hard to maintain.
While giving the appearance of a carefree, nonchalant, and untroubled individual, the
dandy was in fact over-sensitive. However, the dandy deferred and stockpiled these responses.
The following examples make this clear. First, Baudelaire speaks of a “feu latent qui se fait
deviner, qui pourrait mais qui ne veut pas rayonner” (“Le Peintre” 561).74 Baudelaire is hinting
at the great reserves of power behind the neo-stoic mask. Having appropriated and performed an
ancient Stoic behaviour, the dandy inverts its original intention. Instead of helping to allay
passionate response, the mask is actually a space for discontentment to brew. Barbey offers a
similar idea when he says that “il y a dans le Dandysme quelque chose de froid, de sobre, de
railleur et, quoique contenu, d’instantanément mobile, qui doit choquer immensément ces
dramatiques machines a larmes pour qui les attendrissements sont encore plus d’un choix que
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“Regarding the attire, the covering of the modern hero… does it not have a beauty and a charm of its own? […] is
this not an attire that is needed by our age, which is suffering, and dressed up to its thin black narrow shoulders in
the symbol of constant mourning? The black suit and the frock coat not only have their political beauty as an
expression of general quality, but also their poetic beauty as an expression of the public mentality: an immense
cortege of undertakers – political undertakers, amorous undertakers, bourgeois undertakers. We are all attendants at
some kind of funeral” (Salon of 1846)
74
“latent fire, whose existence is merely suspected, and which, if it wanted to, but it does not, could burst forth in all
its brightness” (The Painter 40).
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d’une sympathie” (“Du Dandysme” 157).75 In Barbey’s text too, there is the idea of a tightly
coiled spring. A calm surface does not mean calm below, the mask merely hides an incongruous
expression beneath. As an instance of parody, the dandy uses an imitation for the goal of
satirizing by applying it to an unlikely subject.

Indifference at the Intersection of Modernity: Ennui
This parodic apathy is composed of the blasé attitude and leads ultimately to a state of ennui. As
a specifically urban phenomenon the dandy was especially predisposed to this blasé
countenance, and the dandy sought to perfect this blasé attitude. As Simmel says, “[t]here is
perhaps no psychic phenomenon which is so unconditionally reserved to the city as the blasé
outlook” (“Metropolis” 329). He continues:
The essence of the blasé attitude is an indifference toward the distinctions between
things. Not in the sense that they are not perceived, as is the case of mental dullness, but
rather that the meaning and the value of the distinctions between things and therewith of
the things themselves, are experienced as meaningless. They appear to the blasé person in
a flat and gray colour with no one of them worthy of being preferred to another
(“Metropolis” 329-330).
They sought to convey “la pose d’esprit qui doit avoir fait le tour de beaucoup d’idées et qui est
trop dégoûter pour s’animer” (“Du Dandysme” 119).76 Baudelaire advised the dandies to behave
perinde ac cadaver (“Le Peintre” 560). On a certain level, indifference seems to have also been
an aesthetic choice. Commenting on Brummell’s disdain for emotion, in his preface to “Du
75

“[t]here is in dandyism something cold, sober and mocking, and although restrained, yet capable of instant
motion, which must terribly shock those dramatic tear-machines, for whom emotions are even more than
tenderness” (Dandyism 71)
76
“the attitude of an intelligence familiar with many ideas and too tired of them all to become animated” (Dandyism
42)
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dandysme et de Georges Brummell,” Quentin Crisp says the following: “Since [Brummell]
abhorred fox hunting not because of the cruelty to animals that it involved but because his highly
varnished boots were likely to be bespattered with mud, it seems probable that passion of any
kind was to be shunned on account of the havoc it might wreak upon his carefully arranged
cravat” (11). It is true that the dandy’s blasé attitude is irremediably tied to his concept of beauty,
his “aesthetics of existence”; as Baudelaire says, “le caractère de beauté du dandy consiste
surtout dans l’air froid qui vient de l’inébanlable résolution de ne pas être ému” (“Le Peintre”
561).77
Still, there is more to the dandy’s blasé attitude than merely affecting a certain manner.
The dandy must possess something more:
Singerie n’est pas ressemblance. On peut prendre un air ou une pose comme on vole la
forme d’un frac; mais la comédie est fatiguante: mais un masque est cruel, effroyable à
porter … l’ennui qu’ils respirent et inspirent ne leur donne qu’un faux reflet de
Dandysme. Qu’ils prennent l’air dégoûté, s’ils veulent… (“Du Dandysme” 106)78
What exactly is missing from the imposters’ display is something which floats in and out of the
dandy treatises mysteriously. It is the ability to “produire toujours l’imprévu, ce à quoi l’esprit
accoutumé au joug des règles ne peut pas s’attendre en bonne logique” (“Du Dandysme” 112)79.
The dandy exists in the in-between spaces, shifting between categories, deliberating masking and
unmasking himself and others. Yet, just as the ancient Stoics attain an enlightened state through
adherence to their practice, the true dandy’s sustained apathy, his perpetual blasé, leads him to a
77

“the specific beauty of the dandy consists particularly in that cold exterior resulting from the unshakeable
determination to remain unmoved” (The Painter 40).
78
[t]o ape is not to resemble. Anyone can assume an air or a pose, as they can appropriate the cut of a dress-coat; but
the comedy is tiring, a mask is painful and hideous […] The boredom they respire and inspire gives them but a false
air of Dandyism. Let them look satiated if they will” (Dandyism 26)
79
always to produce the unexpected, that which could not logically be anticipated by those accustomed to the yoke
of rules” (Dandyism 33)
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state of ennui; just as the ancient Stoic eudaimonia affords an immovable calm amidst a sea of
impressions, the dandy’s ennui ultimately prevents any potential engagement with those
impressions outside of this apathetic lens.
There is a vast difference between equating all sensations into a “blasé attitude” and an
ancient Stoic approach to emotions that entails regulation and judgment. The goal of Stoicism is
not to equate all emotions, as it might at first glance seem, but actually to become conscious of
the distinctions between them. Assent, which the Stoics dubbed the moment of interpreting and
classifying one’s response, has, with the inundation of impressions bombarding the dandy in the
metropolis, been set or gotten stuck on the default setting of indifference for the modern dandy.
The dandy may claim to invoke ancient Stoic practice, but it turns out to only be possible to
perform Stoic gestures and not to embody them completely. I have illustrated that the dandy’s
subscription to indifference is more about blunting emotions and shielding himself from
emotional trauma than the pursuit of an enlightened assent from that trauma.
The two main terms that I have presented so far, indifference and apathy, have a close
relative in the concept of ennui. Indifference is the quality of absence of feeling or passion,
somewhat closely defined with lack of interest or attention. In a continuation from this, apathy is
a freedom from suffering or passions or an “indifference to what is calculated to move the
feelings, or to excite interest or action” (“apathy”). Moving beyond this, ennui is “the feeling of
mental weariness and dissatisfaction produced by want of occupation, or by lack of interest in
present surroundings or employments” (“ennui”). Reinhard Kuhn gives the following definition
of ennui: “the state of emptiness that the soul feels when it is deprived of interest in action, life
and the world (be it this world or another), a condition that is the immediate consequence of the
encounter with nothingness, and has as an immediate effect a disaffection with reality” (13, my
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emphasis). Thus, while an indifferent attitude produces an apathetic response to individual
impressions, the multiplied experience of this apathy leads to a state of ennui that predetermines
an apathetic response to all impressions.
The productive and constructive emotion theory of the ancient Stoics becomes twisted
and reworked in the dandy doctrine for the following reasons: first, that the world is no longer a
stable and intrinsically connected or harmonious place; second, that the sheer amount of
impressions has increased substantially in volume and in violence on the senses within the
modern metropolis due to the political, social, economical, and technological factors mentioned.
For these reasons, though indifference first figured productively in ancient Stoic philosophical
doctrine, for the dandy it undergoes a semantic shift. It comes to be associated not with the
process of distinction between emotions and rationalized response, but rather the opposite: a lack
of distinction and a characteristic blurring. Instead of indifference as a choice, there is talk of a
“great yawn of indifference” that “swallows everything – sin and remorse, confession and
relapse, will and impotence, charm and repugnance” (Dalle Pezze and Salzani 7); here is the root
of ennui.
Ennui and its affiliate boredom have a specific history, tracing through acedia, tedium
vitae, melancholia, etc, which has been expanded by literary critics like Reinhard Kuhn, Lars
Svendsen, Elizabeth Goodstein, Barbara Dalle Pezze, and Carlo Salzani. However, though ennui
might resemble and echo the previous incarnations of malaise, it cannot be fully identified with
them because each of their forms is “embedded in a historically and culturally specific way of
understanding and interpreting human experience” (Dalle Pezze and Salzani 11). Instead of
having a singular history, ennui is viewed as “compounded of elements of very different
provenance […] kaleidoscopically” (Goodstein 218).
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Ennui is an amalgam of many influences, and I am suggesting that the dandy’s neo-stoic
appropriation is particularly influential on the formation of ennui. The dandy’s two main
behavioural characteristics, indifference and apathy, are crucial to ennui: writing about
Baudelaire, Barbara Dalle Pezze and Carlo Salzani say that spleen and ennui encompass “sickly
sorrow, distaste for life, apathy and universal indifference” (10, my emphasis). As main
ingredients for ennui, indifference causes the flattening out of existential experience, and apathy
reflects the inability to react to this. I am suggesting that these two qualities are at the core of
ennui, and as such, through the appropriation and parodying of Stoic indifference, dandyism
ultimately transforms an enlightened state of eudaimonia into the nineteenth century Zeitgeist of
Modernity: ennui.

91

CONCLUSION
This thesis has attempted to show that a relationship exists between the emotional theories of
ancient Stoic philosophy and modern dandy theory, both of which lay claim to ‘indifference’.
The dandy texts focused on in this thesis, Barbey’s “Du Dandysme” et de Georges Brummell
(1845) and Baudelaire’s Le peintre de la vie moderne (1863), both offer repeated references,
nominally and performatively, to the dandies as ‘stoic.’ By naming themselves as ‘stoic’ and
proposing to enact certain stoic behaviours like indifference, the dandies invite a comparative
reading of their modern indifference and its relation to the original advocates of indifference, the
ancient Stoics.
Previous attempts at categorizing the dandy’s neo-stoicism had been taken in religious,
historical, and aesthetic directions, but none of these quite satisfy the dandy’s location within
ancient Stoicism. The religious approach as presented by Ernest Raynaud assented to Stoic
influence in dandyism insofar as it was useful to leading to a Catholic reading of the dandies in
the end. The historical approach as presented by Marie-Christine Natta denied the presence of
Stoic influence, judging that the differences in worldviews between the ancient Stoics and the
modern dandies were too great to allow for a parallel. Finally, the aesthetic approach as
presented by Michel Foucault accepted Stoic influence by proposing that both ancient Hellenistic
philosophies (Stoicism in particular) and nineteenth century dandyism have comparable
“aesthetics of existence” or artful ways of living.
Though each of these arguments has merits, they also each have issues. The religious
approach does not actually end up dialoguing with Stoic doctrine except insofar as it influenced
Catholic doctrine, and so its conclusions are based on a Christian-inflected asceticism. The
historical approach is factually correct and my argument does not deny that the changes in
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worldview that have occurred since Stoicism’s prevalence in the ancient world make it not just
difficult, but almost impossible to replicate ancient Stoicism in the nineteenth century. That said,
I have been proposing influence, not duplication, in my own argument. Finally, the aesthetic
approach does not take into account the fact that the scope of aesthetics has shifted since the
ancient world so that it no longer includes so close a relationship between aesthetics and ethics.
In light of these deficiencies in the previous approaches to the influence of ancient Stoicism on
the dandy, I have taken a different direction that I see as more in line with the dandy’s nature.
This thesis proposes that the dandy’s neo-stoicism is based on irony, the modus operandi
of the dandy. The dandy’s irony has been established by other literary critics before me, but my
own interpretation of the dandy’s irony is composed of a mix of appropriation and parody. Irony
denotes a purposeful inversion of meaning in order to achieve dissimulation or pretence, and the
dandy achieves this through appropriation (the practice of reworking or imitating a style from
another work to incite re-evaluation or intellectual challenge) and parody (the use of that
imitation with the goal of satirizing by applying it to an unlikely subject). So, when the dandy
names himself a Stoic and purports to enact Stoic behaviours like indifference in a modern
context, he is imitating and reworking a previous style that in this case belongs to an ancient
philosophy. The belief the dandy does this to incite critical re-evaluation or intellectual challenge
is in line with other arguments by literary critics that identify the dandy as a figure of social
critique. The dandy is also enacting parody in this situation by applying ancient Stoic principles
that are traditionally viewed as ascetic and harsh to himself as a dandy, traditionally viewed as a
rather superficial and materialistic. Because of the general perception of the dandy as linked to
fops, macaronis, and muscadins, the dandy certainly seems an unlikely candidate to receive Stoic
doctrine. And yet, the dandy asserts a parallel, so it must be interpreted.
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I propose that what initially stimulates the dandy’s appropriation and parody of ancient
Stoicism is the dialogue with Stoicism that was occurring within the dandy’s contemporaries in
England and France. I suggest that this dialogue consists of a revival of ancient Stoic emotional
practice as a reaction to new trials facing the modern individual in view of the social, political,
and economic challenges that were occurring at the time, as rebellions and revolutions plagued
both English and French societies. In view of this ‘therapeutic’ dialogue of neo-stoicism, the
dandy was inspired to incorporate certain aspects of ancient Stoicism into his own doctrine.
Since it was ‘fashionable’ to be indifferent, then the dandy – not one to pass by a trend – would
put his own unique spin on it by, as mentioned above, appropriating and parodying the image of
the ancient Stoic. This allows the dandy to act as a distorted mirror or grotesque reflection of his
contemporaries by ironically reworking their discourse on ancient Stoicism in his own theory
and praxis.
Having established first that the dandy makes nominal and performative use of ancient
Stoicism, and then seen how that appropriation fits in with the dialogue of the dandy’s
contemporaries, the final section of this thesis evaluates the extent of the alleged presence of
ancient Stoicism in dandyism. This section compares and contrasts the following shared
constructs between the Stoics and the dandies: ‘impressions’, judgment and rationality, and
preferred indifferents. Mediated by Simmel’s sociological readings of the effects of the
metropolis on the individual, this section shows that the dandies are not strictly ‘faithful’ to the
ancient Stoic philosophy, whether due to their own changes or due to social changes beyond their
control, and end up creating something new. In short, this section shows how the dandies adapt
Stoic emotional philosophy from apatheia to apathy.
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As a short recapitulation of the Stoic echelon of emotion, I offer the following summary.
In ancient Stoic philosophy, concerning emotions, individuals can react to impressions with
either passions (inappropriate reactions) or more hopefully, eupatheiai (good or stable emotions).
The continuous use of rational behaviour and moderation through choosing eupatheiai means
consistently exercising apatheia (remaining above emotions). This in turn eventually leads to
eudaimonia (happiness). It is important to recall that the goal of Stoic emotion theory is not the
elimination of emotional response, but rather productive reasoning through emotional response.
Impressions are instances or occurrences to which an individual reacts. These include
everything that occurs in an individual’s life, from the trivial to the highly significant.
Impressions do not preclude any specific reaction; they are the situation, plain and simple.
Impressions are opportunities for discernment and are separate from whatever emotions will
follow, and need to be recognized as such. These facts do not change in the dandy’s neostoicism, but the quantity does. Georg Simmel shows that the sheer amount of impressions that
the modern individual like the dandy has to deal with increased exponentially from previous
eras. This alters the dynamic to one of over-stimulation on the dandy’s part. This detail is crucial
and will determine to a large degree how the dandy will navigate his way through ancient Stoic
emotion theory.
The section on judgment and rationality covered how the Stoic relied on his ability to
reason as his way to avoid committing ‘errors in judgment’ – that is, falling prey to passions. To
the ancient Stoics, unmediated emotions or direct responses are the result of improper use of
assent. Assent ought to signify the will to rationalize which should be exercised in the face of all
impressions. On the modern front, Simmel says that in the metropolis, man is predisposed to
react dispassionately because of the amount of impressions to which he is subjected.
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Intellectuality is privileged in the modern metropolitan individual because otherwise he would
flounder beneath the assault on his senses. The dandy carries rationality to an extreme. He strives
to uniformly adjudicate impressions of all kinds and relegate them to the same level.
Preferred indifferents are also a parallel between ancient Stoicism and modern dandyism.
Ancient Stoics and modern dandies recognize that certain advantages are preferable in life and
can make life considerably easier, but are not required for happiness. Such preferred indifferents
include health and wealth. The difference here lies in the fact that the dandy wants to keep all the
perks of the preferred indifferents regardless of their actual presence.
In the end, the modern dandy interpreted ancient Stoic philosophy with significant
changes in his own neo-stoicism. The dandy took hold of the concept of indifference but instead
of using it productively like the ancient Stoics, he turned it into apathy. While presenting an
indifferent face to the world, in reality the dandy was only masking and deferring his own
emotions. This in turn means that however lofty his intentions might claim to be by parodying
ancient Stoic practices, the dandy in fact ends up diverting from Stoic practices and using them
to mould the zeitgeist of nineteenth century modernism: ennui. Instead of a constructive
apatheia, there is a theorization and aestheticization of indifference which produces ennui.
The nineteenth century dandy, living and fictional, is a prime example of ennui in both
life and literature, and this thesis proposes that this is in part due to the dandy’s appropriation and
parody of ancient Stoic philosophy and in part to the instability of Modernity. The dandy’s final
‘product’ may not have been as ‘constructive’ emotionally as ancient Stoic theory, but certainly
helped to define a perspective which survives to this day: the blasé and apathetic attitude which
has even, one could argue, turned into something of an epidemic. In this vein, my research hopes
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to situate itself at an intersection of studies on indifference, neo-stoicism, irony, and ennui, with
a view to helping identify the impetus of a behaviour that helped to define an age.
This topic merited examination because indifference is one of the dandy’s main features
and had not been comprehensively studied before. This thesis is limited to dandy texts by Barbey
and Baudelaire because they are the ones who begin theorization of dandyism and help it grow
and support praxis as well. However, it is conceivable that this reading could be extended to
other dandies and dandy texts. I hope to have shown that there is a place in literary criticism for
dandyism to be examined vis-à-vis ancient philosophy, and that the dialogue of ancient
philosophical influence in dandyism that was begun by David Mazella with his book The Making
of Modern Cynicism (2007) will continue.
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